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I. INTRODUCTION
A familiar mathematical axiom holds that the shortest distance
between two points is a straight line.' Indeed, in most any human endeavor
simplicity should be encouraged and complexity discouraged. Modem armies,
for example, adhere to acronyms' intended to remind leaders and followers
alike to strive for simplicity in an effort to conserve energy and avoid
misunderstandings. It can be stated intuitively that complexity inevitably
excludes understanding in a certain portion of the intended audience. Those
who engineer complexity understand it best, but understanding decreases as
one moves farther from the source until the thing engineered is not understood at all.3 More importantly, complexity causes unnecessary expense, it
results in a diversion of resources, and, by the weight of its own process,
obscures the original goal to the ultimate extent that the goal is deemed
unworthy of achievement.4

1. Arthur F. Coxford & Zalman P. Usiskin, Geometry: A Transformation Approach
403 (1971).
2. For example "KISS" means "Keep It Simple, Stupid." It is a "catchphrase used
by the military to remind commanders that complex military plans seldom work in wartime
conditions, and that it's best to keep tactics and strategies as simple as possible." S.F.
Tomajczyk, Dictionary of the Modem United States Military 336 (1996).
3. The idea that drafters intentionally make tax laws and regulations complex is
cynical, but one which has been expressed from time to time:
[T]here is a perverse incentive for the draftsmen of Treasury Regulations
to write the regulations as long and complex as possible. The draftsmen
know that they will probably soon be entering private practice, where they
can make a lucrative living pontificating on their own regulations. It has
become common for draftsmen to leave Treasury shortly after the
regulations are issued, in many cases, no doubt, lured by the potential to
make a buck off their own regulations. Several prior draftsmen now give
speaking tours around the country. Others have profited by writing books.
Thus, there is a tremendous economic incentive for the draftsmen to write
regulations that are as obscure, complex, and arcane as possible.
Schuyler M. Moore, A Proposal to Reduce The Complexity of Tax Regulations, 37 Tax Notes
1167 (1987).
4. The problem of complexity in tax law is an old one and is explored in great
detail in various articles. See generally James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax
Practitioner, 45 Tax L. Rev. 7 (1989); Farley P. Katz, The Infernal Revenue Code, 50 Tax
Law. 617 (1997); Sheldon D. Pollock, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax
Simplification, 2 Geo. Mason. Indep. L. Rev. 319 (1994); Sidney I. Roberts et al., A Report
on Complexity and The Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 325 (1972); Adrian J. Sawyer, Why Are
Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits? 73 Tax Notes 1337 (1996); Stanley S. Surrey,
Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail,
34 Law & Contemp. Probs. 673 (1969); Michelle J. White, Why Are Taxes So Complex and
Who Benefits? 47 Tax Notes 341 (1990).
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The Internal Revenue Code has never been hailed as an example of
the mathematical axiom concerning the shortest distance between the status
quo and a desirable result. In fairness though, complexity in the Code is often
in response to other factors, including complexity in financial transactions.'
The latter complexity is not necessarily without purpose. It is often employed,
for example, to provide assurances between trading partners who do not trust
one another or, as is the wont of lawyers, in an exercise in overkill designed
to anticipate every possible contingency. Complexity is also sometimes used
in an effort to shield, hide, or recharacterize the nature of income generated
by a particular transaction. Thus, in its own complexity, the Code is often
necessarily designed to root out the true character of a given transaction.6
Sometimes the Code is designed to allow a narrow way to achieve a desirable
goal and simultaneously avoid undesirable side effects. 7 All of this, in simple
terms, is only to say that whenever a particular provision or regulatory
requirement is characterized by, fosters, encourages, or condones complexity,
there ought to be an apparent and sound justification.
This conclusion, that complexity ought to be purposeful and not
gratuitous, is demonstrated by the emergence of joint operating agreements.
Also known as "virtual mergers,"8 joint operating agreements are the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service")-approved mechanisms9 by which unrelated tax

5. One commentator, however, argues that tax complexity is not only a result of
complexity in business transactions but also a cause of such complexity. Pollock. supra note
4, at 338 ("The rise in complexity of the tax laws cannot be attributed solely to an increasingly
complex economy and business world. Rather, the tax laws themselves contributed to the
complexity in the business world.") Resolving the debate is like trying to determine whether
the chicken preceded the egg.
6. The passive activity limitation rules are favorite examples of complex anti-abuse
provisions. IRC § 469. But other provisions rival the passive activity rules for complexity. See,
e.g., IRC §§ 1272-1275, 7872 (pertaining to imputed interest), 1311. See generally H. Stewart
Dunn, Improved Development of Complex Tax Legislation, 10 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 307. 313-20
(1992).
7. IRC § 501(h), for example, provides tax exempt organizations with an objective
measure of how much propaganda and legislative activity in which they may engage without
jeopardizing their tax exempt status under IRC § 501(c)(3) (which prohibits tax exempt
organizations from making such activities a "substantial" part of their operations). The process
of applying IRC § 501(h) is painfully complex and involved, but is probably justified because
it allows exempt organizations to safely engage in a certain level of propaganda and legislative
advocacy with the assurance that they will not lose their tax exemptions.
8. Michael W. Peregrine & Robert L. Capizzi, New Developments In Tax Planning
for Joint Operating Company Arrangements, 14 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 101 (1996); Roderick
Darling & Marvin Friedlander, Internal Revenue Service. Virtual Mergers-Hospital Joint
Operating Agreement Affiliations, in 1996 Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional
Education Technical Instruction Program Textbook 131, 132 (1996).
9. The Service has not issued regulations or any other guidance upon which
taxpayers may rely regarding joint operating agreements. Instead, it has expressed its approval
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exempt organizations may pool resources to obtain goods and services
necessary to the accomplishment of their common goal without diverting the
charitable fund to waste, profit-taking by other individuals or entities, or
taxation by the government. Virtual mergers are so-called because they
involve detailed contractual undertakings, not amounting to legal merger
under state law,' 0 but creating sufficient governance, management, and
financial connections between several entities such that the previously
unrelated parties are treated as a single entity for purposes of Regulations
section 1.502-1(b)." As a result the several entities are allowed to consolidate the performance of their activities by use of a newly created exempt

of joint operating agreements through a series of private letter rulings. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9722-042 (Mar. 3, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-21-031 (Feb. 26, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-16-021
(Jan. 17, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-14-011 (Dec. 24, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24,
1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-011 (Feb. 29, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-09-011 (Nov. 22, 1995).
The legal standards applied in each of the rulings are essentially identical. Private Letter
Rulings may not be used or cited as precedent unless the Secretary of Treasury determines
otherwise. IRC § 61100)(3).
10. Darling & Friedlander, supra note 8, at 132. ("Because a joint operating
agreement affiliation is not a true merger, it has come to be called a "'virtual merger.' "),
11. Regs. § 1.502-1(b) provides:
If a subsidiary organization of a tax-exempt organization would itself be
exempt on the ground that its activities are an integral part of the exempt
activities of the parent organization, its exemption will not be lost because,
as a matter of accounting between two organizations, the subsidiary
derives a profit from its dealings with its parent organization, for example,
a subsidiary organization which is operated for the sole purpose of
furnishing electric power used by its parent organization, a tax exempt
educational organization, in carrying on its educational activities. However,
the subsidiary organization is not exempt from tax if it is operated for the
primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business which would be an
unrelated trade or business (that is, unrelated to exempt activities) if
regularly carried on by the parent organization. For example, if a
subsidiary organization is operated primarily for the purpose of furnishing
electric power to consumers other than its parent organization (and the
parent's tax exempt subsidiary organizations), it is not exempt since such
business would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by
the parent organization. Similarly, if the organization is owned by several
unrelated exempt organizations, and is operated for the purpose of
furnishing electric power to each of them, it is not exempt since such
business would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by
any one of the tax-exempt organizations. For purposes of this paragraph,
organizations are related only if they consist of: (1) A parent organization
and one or more of its subsidiary organizations; or (2) Subsidiary
organizations having a common parent organization. An exempt organization is not related to another exempt organization merely because they
both engage in the same type of exempt activities.
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entity without engaging in unrelated business activity or otherwise jeopardizing their separate tax exempt statuses.
Using the mathematical analogy to illustrate, point A is the status quo
at which the unrelated parties have a common need which must be met if
they are to achieve a commonly-held goal. For example, five tax exempt
hospitals in a given locale, although unrelated, might share a common need
for a specialized medical diagnosis procedure. Point B is the later point at
which the exempt organizations are able to obtain necessary goods and
services at cost and without wasting charitable funds or diverting them to
personal profit or taxation. To remain with the above example, the five
hospitals might each establish a captive subsidiary to provide the diagnostic
procedure at cost, or they might each establish an in-house facility. Each
exempt hospital would then be able to obtain the necessary service without
the diversion of the charitable fisc to personal profit or taxation.' 2 Still,
neither option would constitute the shortest distance as it relates to all the
hospitals because the five-fold duplication creates waste and a combined
capacity which outweighs overall demand. The shortest, i.e., least complex,
distance from point A to point B would be to allow the exempt organizations
to share access to a single facility which would provide all five organizations
with diagnostic services at cost and on a consolidated basis, thereby achieving
a certain self-contained economy based on charity rather than profit and
ultimately working to the advantage of common charitable beneficiaries.
However, this option would not get the hospitals entirely to point B because
the resulting "consolidated" entity would be taxable under present law. 3
Neither could any one hospital provide the diagnostic service to the four other
hospitals on a consolidated basis without engaging in an unrelated business
activity.14 To gain tax exempt status, avoid the imposition of the unrelated
business income tax, and remain in compliance with Regulations section
1.502-1(b), the exempt organizations must actually merge or engage in a
complex transaction resulting in a virtual merger. The tax free consolidation
of services is thereby finally achieved but the process is much more
expensive and complex than if the unrelated parent organizations were
permitted to create a single mutually-owned subsidiary or designate one of
their five to provide the service for the entire group.

12. Regulations section 1.502-1(b) would shield the hospitals from taxation in either
case.
13. "If the organization is owned by several unrelated exempt organizations and is
operated for the purpose of furnishing electric power to each of them. it is not exempt since
such business would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by any one of
the exempt organizations." Reg. § 1.502-1(b).
14. Id.
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Since the goal, consolidation, is manifestly desirable and complexity
is to be avoided when possible, it is appropriate to ask what purpose is served
by Regulations section 1.502-1(b)'s insistence upon virtual mergers as a
means to achieve the goal rather than opting for the easier approach of
allowing unrelated exempt organizations to create a single exempt subsidiary
or allowing one exempt entity to serve similarly situated entities. Why should
the exempt organizations be required to "reinvent the wheel?" After all,
Regulations section 1.502-1(b) presently allows the five unrelated exempt
organizations, for example, to establish five separate exempt subsidiaries
without taxation so long as each of the five subsidiaries provides goods or
services solely to its single parent. What purpose is served, then, by taxing
five unrelated exempt organizations who establish one mutual subsidiary but
not taxing those organizations when they collectively establish five separate
subsidiaries? How does the imposition of the joint operating agreement
requirement make the former option less objectionable than it is already
deemed to be?
The primary focus of Regulations section 1.502-1(b) is preventing
exempt organizations from engaging in unfair competition. 5 Thus, to
prevent the competitive disadvantages to taxable entities resulting from
exempt organizations engaging in business activity, Regulations section
1.502-1(b) requires that exempt organizations undertake an arduous process
which results in a merger as a legal fiction-a virtual merger. 6 The joint
operating agreement is thought to bring otherwise unrelated exempt
organizations within the literal meaning of Regulations section 1.502-1 (b) and
thereby achieves the purpose of preventing unfair competition. 7 Yet from
the standpoint of taxable entities, the purported beneficiaries of the requirement, the end result is identical regardless of the process by which consolidation is achieved. By whatever process, mutual subsidiary or joint operating
agreement, there results a new entity which provides goods and services that
might otherwise be provided by existing taxable entities, albeit at greater
expense to the exempt recipient entities. The only apparent difference is that
the joint operating agreement requirement is more expensive and time

15. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1994);
Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394, 401 (1993); Associated Hospital
Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213, 223-24 (1980); Hospital Bureau of Standards and
Supplies v. United States 158 F. Supp. 560, 563-64 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The regulation was
originally enacted on August 4, 1952, as Regs. § 29.101-3(b), I 11.
16. Darling & Friedlander, supra note 8, at 134. ("If the hospitals establish a "super"
parent to implement the joint operating agreement, and the facts and circumstances establish
that the equivalent of a parent-subsidiary relationship exists, then the "super" parent will be
considered to be an integral part of the subsidiaries. Thus, essential services it provides to the
subsidiaries will not constitute unrelated trade or business.")
17. Id.
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consuming. Hence, the complexity of virtual mergers and the disadvantages
attendant to them-primarily diversion of resources, but also the discouragement of innovation and/or centralization of charitable services-do not appear
justified by any good policy reason, unless the complexity is intended to
serve as negative reinforcement of tax exempt subsidiaries.
This article questions the validity of Regulations section 1.502-1(b)
and its resulting insistence upon virtual mergers. It argues that the regulation
is invalid as having no basis in section 502, the statute under which it was
codified. This article argues, instead, that the regulation is a logically
incorrect amalgamation of two distinct judicial tax doctrines by which tax
exemption may be or could have been gained vicariously: (1) the integral part
doctrine which allows one organization to achieve tax exemption on the basis
of another organization's charitable activities, 8 and (2) the now-discarded
destination of income doctrine under which tax exemption could be had on

18. The integral part doctrine did not originate with Regs. § 1.502-1(b). Instead it
arose from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Squire v. Student Books, 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1951). In that case, a tax exempt educational institution owned all the stock of a bookstore
which sold textbooks and supplies to the college's students and faculty. The court held that
the bookstore was entitled to tax exemption because its activities stood in a "close and intimate
relationship to the functioning of the College itself." Id. at 1020. Recently, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals mistakenly traced the "genesis" of the integral part doctrine to Regs.
§ 1.502-1(b). Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 494, 499 (3d Cir. 1944). As
noted earlier, though, the regulation was first enacted in 1952, a year after the decision in
Squires. See supra note 15. More importantly, though, the Third Circuit in Geisinger confused
the vicarious nature of the integral part doctrine. The doctrine, as demonstrated in Squires and
even Regs. § 1.502-1(b), grants exempt status to an organization which provides admittedly
commercial goods and services exclusively to a tax exempt parent. Tax exemption is granted
to the first organization because it is viewed as the second organization's alter ego, not
because the first organization is otherwise engaged in a charitable activity. In Geisinger,
though, the court stated that the organization's relationship to a tax exempt organization must
"somehow enhance[] the subsidiary's own exempt character to the point that, when the boost
provided by the parent is added to the contribution made by the subsidiary itself, the subsidiary
would be entitled to § 501(c)(3) status." 30 F.3d 494, 501 (emphasis added). The integral part
doctrine applies when the organization has no independent exempt character but is seeking to
qualify vicariously through assistance to another organization's exempt activities. The "boost"
characterization used in Geisinger would have resulted in the denial of tax exempt status to
the bookstore in Squires because the bookstore had no exempt character separate from the
College whose students and faculty it served. In a more recent case, the Tax Court did not
adopt the Geisinger "boost" rationale but indicated that the Squires integral part doctrine could
apply to mutual organizations such as those prohibited by Regs. § 1.502-1(b):
The cases applying this doctrine have held that where an organization (1)
bears a "close and intimate relationship" to the operation of one or more
tax-exempt organizations and (2) provides a "necessary and indispensable"
service solely to those tax-exempt organizations, it will take on the exempt
status of those organizations.
University Med. Resident Serv. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3130 (1996).
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the sole basis that all the earnings of a corporation, however realized, were
distributed to an organization directly providing charitable goods and
services.' 9 An analysis of the two doctrines shows they are oriented toward
distinct aspects of the unfair competition problem and do not simply address
the same problem in different ways. Although the two doctrines may be
legally and theoretically sound as separate doctrines, they are legally and
theoretically unsound as a single merged doctrine resulting in the requirement
of virtual mergers.
This article also argues that the abdication of judicial power with
respect to Regulations section 1.502-1(b), particularly by the United States
Tax Court,2" contributes to unnecessary complexity. The Tax Court has
essentially admitted that the regulation has no statutory or even logical
support.2' In the end, though, the Tax Court sustained the regulation based
upon a questionable application of principles of judicial deference to
administrative rulemaking. Had it overturned the regulation, the Tax Court
would have eliminated the needless complexity which presently unnecessarily
attaches to exempt organizations' efforts to economize through consolidation.
Rather, the Tax Court assumed that the complexity of the issue demanded
that it take an unduly deferential approach to the regulation and thereby
perpetuated the complexity of virtual mergers.22
Finally, this article concludes that even were the regulation a valid
interpretation of law, it is nevertheless incorrect as a matter of tax policy
because it fosters complexity without a corresponding policy benefit. The
regulation is grounded on the rejection of the self-contained charitable
economic model; that is, a separate economic system comprised of direct
providers of charitable goods and services which own and are served by a
secondary market within the same economy. Within this self-contained
economic model, the secondary market is comprised of tax exempt entities
indistinguishable from ordinary commercial businesses except for their
limitation of customers to their charitable parent entities, all of whom share
a common charitable goal. Thus, the economy is based upon charitable need,
rather than profit, as the production incentive and the system's currency
remains exclusively within the exempt economy, neither taxed nor subject to
profit-taking. Regulations section 1.502-1(b) unalterably deems this selfcontained economy as one which results in unfair competition, apparently on
the basis of the same considerations which underlie the rejection of the

19. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776, 778-79 (2nd Cir. 1938);
C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1950).
20. Associated Hospital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213,226-31 (1980).
21. Id. at 227.
22. The Tax Court termed the history behind the enactment and application of Regs.
§ 1.502-1(b) a "perplexing saga." Id. at 222.
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destination of income doctrine. The drafters presume that without the
regulation, the resulting self-contained economy would have a negative effect
on the taxable economy in the same manner as organizations claiming
exemption under the destination of income doctrine. This article argues that
the premise of Regulations section 1.502-1(b) is incorrect and that the
complexity engendered by the regulation, in the form of joint operating
agreements, is therefore unnecessary. The solution suggested by this article
is the repeal of Regulations section 1.502-1(b) and a reliance, instead, upon
sections 501(c)(3) 23 and 51124 of the Code, as the exclusive tools by which
to prevent unfair competition. This simple solution, properly applied, would
allow tax exempt organizations to get from point A to point B, without the

23. Section 501(c)(3) might have been enacted as four separate provisions since it
contains (1) the identification of those organizations entitled to exempt status, (2)a prohibition
against the use of tax exempt revenues for private gain, (3) a partial prohibition against
activities involving propaganda or attempts to influence legislation, and (4) a total prohibition
against participation in campaign activities. As it is. IRC § 501(c)(3) provides exemption for:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment). or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
The provision thus covers all of the basic issues relating to operation of a tax exempt
organization. There are, of course, 27 other subdivisions of § 501tc)(3) which grant tax
exemption on other grounds. But approximately 630,000 of the 1.5 million exempt
organizations in the United States are classified as 501(c)(3) organizations. I.R.S. Fact Sheet
97-7 (Feb. 1997). Approximately 300,000 exempt organizations are churches and 140,000
organizations are 501(c)(4) organizations. Id. Unless otherwise specified, this article focuses
on 501(c)(3) organizations.
24. The unrelated business income tax, unlike the rules regarding basic qualification,
is set out in incremental statutes. Section 511 imposes a tax on "unrelated business taxable
income." Section 512 defines unrelated business taxable income as income from an "unrelated
trade or business." Section 513(a) defines unrelated trade or business:
The term "unrelated trade or business" means, in the case of any
organization subject to the tax imposed by section 511. any trade or
business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the
need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the
profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its
charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis
for its exemption under section 501 ....
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complexity of, and without sacrificing the policy interests thought to be
protected by, joint operating agreements.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS

The basic concept underlying joint operating agreements-virtual
mergers-is consolidation. In its most prevalent present use, a joint operating
agreement results in two or more tax exempt hospitals associating in an effort
to eliminate duplicative services and thereby reduce operating expenses, gain
negotiating power with third party payers or service providers, and reduce
overall costs to patients.' The result of the joint operating agreement is the
creation of a consolidation entity,26 normally a partnership or a corporation,
which governs and coordinates the activities of the participating hospitals.
The consolidation entity might itself perform administrative services for all
participants to the joint operating agreement or it might designate one of the
participants as the central provider of particular administrative services for all
other participants. From a tax standpoint, the primary concern for the
participating hospitals is that the consolidation entity not be subject to
corporate tax if the entity is organized as a corporation, or that the participating hospitals not be subject to the unrelated business income tax if the

25. See Steven R. Hollis, Strategic and Economic Factors In The Hospital
Conversion Process, 16 Health Affairs 131, 132 (1997) (affiliations generally motivated by
desire to obtain "negotiating clout" with health maintenance organizations, and to achieve
"economies of scale"). Joint operating agreements have not previously been the subject of
analysis from a policy perspective. The "nuts and bolts" of joint operating agreements,
however, have been discussed in recent literature. See Rochelle Korman & William F. Gaske,
Joint Ventures Between Tax-Exempt and Commercial Health Care Providers, 74 Tax Notes
1575 (1997) (providing an excellent overview of the nonprofit/for-profit hospital structures
emerging in the last 20 years). The following articles provide insights into the more practical
aspects of joint operating agreements but do not address the integral part doctrine's validity
or necessity: Leslie J. Gold, IRS Issues Favorable Ruling on Company Coordinating Multiple
Hospital Alliance, Daily Tax Rep., Dec. 6, 1996, at G-l; Gerald M. Griffith & Brad M.
Tomtishen, IRS Adopts Facts and Circumstances Approach for JOAs-Part One, 14 Exempt
Org. Tax Rev. 403 (1996); Gerald M. Griffith & Brad M. Tomtishen, Exempt Hospital
Affiliations: Bond and UBIT Issues-Part Two, 13 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 215 (1996); Gerald
M. Griffith & Brad M. Tomtishen, Exempt Hospital Affiliations: Bond and UBIT Issues, 11
Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 709 (1995); Peregrine & Capizzi, supra note 8, at 101; Michael W.
Peregrine et al., New Guidance on Tax Treatment of Joint Operating Agreements, 13 Exempt
Org. Tax Rev. 439 (1996).
26. The resulting entity is more often called a "joint operating company" or a
"super" parent. This article uses the term "consolidation entity" because it identifies the
organization's functions in the same manner that the term "feeder organization" readily
identifies organizations which function only to "feed" profits to an organization exempt under
IRC § 501(c)(3).
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consolidation entity is a partnership. 27 Additionally, the hospital participants
seek to avoid engaging in unrelated business activity or otherwise jeopardizing their separate tax exempt statuses by virtue of their sharing administrative
burdens, such as billing or payroll activities. Once approved by the Service,
the joint operating agreement will result in an exempt organization, the
consolidation entity, which is owned by, takes its power and authority from,
governs, and operates for the exclusive benefit of its tax exempt owners.
Although joint operating agreements are particular to the nonprofit
health care industry, the concept of a tax exempt consolidation entity, i.e., an
organization having as its claim to tax exemption the centralized provision of
services to other tax exempt organizations, is neither foreign nor unprecedented to tax law. The Service has previously approved tax exempt status for
organizations which do not directly provide a charitable service, but which
provide seemingly commercial services exclusively to organizations which
themselves provide charitable services. For example, in Revenue Ruling 38512' the Service approved tax exempt status for an organization that
operated a cemetery exclusively for the benefit of its member churches. In
Revenue Ruling 69-572,29 the Service approved tax exempt status for an
organization that constructed, owned and operated a building which provided
rental space exclusively for other tax exempt entities. ' a Likewise, Congress
has granted tax exempt status to certain organizations-apparently selected

27. IRC § 512(c)(1) imposes the unrelated business tax on the partners when the
unrelated activity is conducted via a partnership.
28. 1938-2 C.B. 166.
29. 1969-2 C.B. 119. Other rulings granting tax exempt status to an organization
which provides services exclusively to tax exempt entities include Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2
C.B. 234 (organization that provides management services for unrelated colleges' and
universities' endowment funds held exempt under IRC § 501(c)(3)), and Rev. Rul. 74-614,
1974-2 C.B. 164 (organization providing computer services to several unrelated colleges and
universities held exempt under IRC § 501(c)(3)).
30. Revenue Ruling 69-572, 1969-2 C.B. 119, is most significant because of its
explicit recognition that a charitable purpose is manifested through the consolidation of the
efforts of other exempt organizations:
Because of the close connection between [the applicant organization] and
the charitable functions of the tenant-organizations, the rental of the
organization's facilities at rates substantially below their fair rental value,
and the operation by the organization with the intention of realizing an
amount sufficient only to meet annual operating costs, the organization is
dedicated to carrying out the charitable endeavors of the community chest
and its member agencies.
The ruling did not discuss the potential for unfair competition.
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without identifiable rhyme or reason-which provide otherwise commercial
services solely to tax exempt organizations. 3'
Section 501(m) of the Code is especially noteworthy in that it
specifically rejects the consolidation concept as it might apply to a company
that sells "commercial-type insurance" solely to tax exempt organizations."
Again, there is no apparent rhyme or reason to the rejection of the concept
when applied to the insurance industry, but section 501(m) certainly suggests
a recognition of the basic concept. 33 Hence, the idea that the definition of
"charity" might include the provision of cost or below cost goods and
services to unrelated tax exempt organizations which themselves directly
assist a class of beneficiaries is not at all new to tax jurisprudence.
The Service's grant of tax exempt status to consolidation entities
resulting from joint operating agreements implies a further recognition of the
underlying concept, but only after a good deal more refinement or perhaps
regression, depending upon one's viewpoint. Unlike joint operating agreements, in which structural form is of paramount importance, the Service
granted tax exempt status in older rulings to entities serving similar or even
dissimilar tax exempt entities without regard to the structure between the
service entity and the tax exempt entities being served.' 4 When the concept
is recognized in various Code provisions, there is also little attention paid to
the structure of the relationships between the consolidation entity and the tax
exempt organizations being served or between the tax exempt organizations
themselves.3 5 Under the present incarnation of the consolidation concept, by
way of joint operating agreements, the relationship between the consolidation
entity and the tax exempt participants, and the relationship between the tax
exempt participants themselves is absolutely dispositive.
Ultimately, approval of tax exempt status for the consolidation entity
and avoidance of tax liability by the individual participants depends upon a

31. See IRC § 501(c)(12) (mutual ditch, irrigation or cooperative telephone
companies); IRC § 501(c)(13) (mutual cemetery companies); IRC § 501(c)(25) (mutual real
estate management company); IRC § 501(e) (hospital service organizations); IRC § 501(f)
(cooperative mutual fund managers); IRC § 501(n) (charitable risk pools).
32. Florida Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 140 (1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d
808 (11 th Cir. 1996) (affirmed without reaching the § 501(m) issue).
33. In addition, IRC § 501(n) creates an exception to IRC § 501(m), which might
itself be viewed as an exception to IRC § 501(c)(3) and therefore an implicit recognition that
mutual organizations might achieve tax exempt status under IRC § 501(c)(3). IRC § 501(n)
grants tax exempt status to a limited class of captive and mutual insurance companies. I have
previously discussed captive and mutual insurance companies as they relate to IRC § 501 (c)(3)
and Regs. § 1.502-1(b). Darryll K. Jones, The Lingering Demise of Tax Exempt Mutual and
Captive Insurance Companies, 69 Fla. B.J. 88 (1995).
34. See supra note 29.
35. See supra note 30.
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high degree of governance, managerial and financial integration between and
amongst the consolidation entity and the service recipients; an actual merger
is not required but a mutual association or joint venture such as is found in
previous revenue rulings or in various code provisions is insufficient. Instead,
the essential goal of a joint operating agreement, if it is to be approved by the
Service, is the appearance of a single parent controlling one or more
subsidiaries. Approval not only results in tax exempt status for the consolidation entity, but also allows any one of the subsidiaries to engage in otherwise
normal business activity for the benefit of co-participants without engaging
in an unrelated activity or otherwise jeopardizing their existing tax exempt
status. So long as the activity is one which any one of the participating could
perform for itself without incurring unrelated business income tax, and there
is a sufficient degree of governance, management and financial integration,
the consolidation entity will be granted tax exempt status and none of the
participating entities will be considered to be engaging in an unrelated
activity.
Through private correspondence 6 and internal agency training
material,37 the Service has listed several factors which it deems important
to the establishment of sufficient governance, management, and financial
integration. The factors are prefaced by an introductory comment which
clarifies that the joint operating agreement must result in the appearance and
substance of a shifting of functions and income from one department to
another within a single entity, even though the agreement involves several
unrelated entities.38 The comment further emphasizes that no single fact or
pattern of facts is required, but the totality of the facts and circumstances
must demonstrate a centralized source of control over the several entities such

36. Internal Revenue Service Letter to Applicants for Hospital Joint Operating
Agreements Setting Out Factors For Exemption, reprinted in Daily Tax Rep.. July 24, 1996,
at L-2 [hereinafter, JOA Applicant Letter].
37. Darling & Friedlander, supra note 8. at 135-36.
38. The Service is looking for explicit manifestations of control under all
the facts and circumstances of a joint operating agreement (JOA) between
otherwise unrelated hospitals or hospital systems such that dealings
between the hospitals (and the parts of the hospital system that are
completely financially integrated) under the agreement are merely [al
matter of accounting between related organizations rather than rising to a
level of unrelated trade or business activity contemplated by section 513
This is a flexible control analysis that does not rely on
of the Code ....
structural control or any one factor (although some factors are more
significant than others) but, rather, a preponderance of all the facts and
circumstances that demonstrate that significant control over management
and financial decisions have been ceded by participating entities to a
mutual governing body under a joint operating agreement
JOA Applicant Letter, supra note 36.
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that the several ostensibly unrelated entities function as a single multidepartmental unit.39
The factors which the Service believes demonstrate the required
control include whether the joint operating agreement delegates "significant
management responsibility" to the consolidation entity. 40 For this factor to
demonstrate the desired control, the consolidation entity must have concrete
authority not only over long range plans, but also over "day-to-day"
management decisions. A second factor considers the ease with which a joint
operating agreement may be dissolved or a participant may withdraw from
the joint operating agreement." The easier it is to dissolve or withdraw from
39. Id. The Service further instructs its field agents that:
The ... facts and circumstances provide the basis for more flexible
control analysis that does not rely strictly on the degree of structural
control or any one factor. Although some factors are more significant than
others, the analysis looks to a preponderance of all the facts and circumstances that demonstrates significant control over management and
financial decisions which have been ceded by participating entities to a
governing body under a joint operating agreement or a "super" parent
organization. There may be other facts and circumstances that have not
been listed and they too will be considered if raised by organizations.
Darling & Friedlander, supra note 8, at 134-35.
40. Elements of specific management authority include:
(1)
Authority to establish budgets. This significant aspect includes responsibility to establish overall budgets, as well as authority to approve major
expenditures, debt, contracts, managed care agreements, and capital
expenditures. This aspect also considers whether the JOA governing body
regularly meets to establish long term and short term budgets and to
implement its decisions.
(2)
Authority by the JOA governing body to monitor and audit each participating entity's compliance with its directives. This is a significant aspect.
(3)
Authority to direct services. This significant aspect considers whether the
JOA governing body can direct that health care services be undertaken or
not be undertaken by the participating entities. For example, whether the
governing body of the JOA can direct a participating hospital to refrain
from being a provider of pediatric services.
(4)
Authority to enter agreements that bind participating entities, particularly
agreements with managed care providers.
(5)
Authority to hire and fire personnel.
(6)
Authority to grant hospital staff privileges.
(7)
Authority to set or approve fees and prices.
(8)
Authority to buy assets for and sell assets of participating entities.
(9)
Authority to re-allocate income among the participating entities to balance
income and expenses to assure financial integration and to achieve mutual
objectives.
Id. at 135.
41. Factors that establish a permanent arrangement include whether there are
significant penalties or other hindrances to terminating the agreement, and whether
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a joint operating agreement, the less logical it is to view the arrangement as
a merger-in-fact. The third factor is actually a subset of the second factor and
focuses on whether the joint operating agreement establishes informal dispute
mechanisms.42 The existence of informal dispute resolution procedures,
particularly binding arbitration, makes it more difficult for a participant to
withdraw from the joint operating agreement and thereby provides a level of
permanence coming closer to that found in an actual merger. The fourth
factor listed by the Service is whether any particular participant possesses or
may exercise routine veto power over decisions made by the consolidation
entity.4 3 If so, then authority really hasn't been ceded to the consolidation
entity since any one party might thwart the consolidation entity's authority.
Under the facts and circumstances approach, only a preponderance of these
factors need be present to demonstrate an integrated governance, managerial,
and financial structure. The reservation of too much veto power, however, is
logically most significant since the exercise of that power could negate the
existence of all other factors.

there are mechanisms such as direct negotiations and binding arbitration in place to
resolve disputes among the parties. The degree to which the JOA is permanent also
effects the determination whether the JOA establishes the equivalent of a parentsubsidiary relationship.
Id. at 136.
42. This factor is indeed listed as part of the second factor in the training material.
See id. But it is listed as a third factor in correspondence to applicants. JOA Applicant Letter,
supra note 36.
43. A veto power is not the same as a power to initiate an action. If the
authority ceded to the JOA governing body is merely the power to veto
actions taken by participating hospitals, then the facts and circumstances
necessary to establish the equivalent of a parent-subsidiary relationship
would not be present. Similarly, if actions of the JOA governing body are
subject to veto by the participating hospitals, this too would negate a
finding that the hospitals function as subordinates of the JOA.
If participating hospitals retain some authority, this is not
necessarily determinative of whether the equivalent of a parent-subsidiary
relationship has been established. For example, authority over ethical or
moral issues based on religious principles may be reserved by the participating entities. If all of the other surrounding facts and circumstances
showed that sufficient authority had otherwise been ceded to the JOA
governing body, this type of reservation would not preclude a finding that
the equivalent of parent-subsidiary relationship had been established.
Darling & Friedlander, supra note 8, at 136 (headings omitted).
Two practitioners suggest that instead of allowing a party to veto action with respect
to a very significant matter, the Service prefers that the agreement not allow the action in the
first place except in accordance with a supermajority voting provision. Kenneth L Tracy &
Elizabeth B. Lewis, Latest JOA Ruling Confirms Internal Revenue Service Flexibility on
Parent-Subsidiary Relationship Issue, 16 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 449. 455 (1997).

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 3:9

In the original series of private letter rulings approving the implementation of joint operating agreements, 44 the Service discussed the governance
and managerial factors which supported its approval of the arrangements. The
results in all four rulings was the creation of tax exempt consolidation entities
and a determination in each ruling that an exempt participant would not
derive unrelated business income from the provision of goods and services
to another participant.
Although the results were identical in each ruling, the Service
discussed the governance and managerial factors in much greater detail in the
second and third rulings. In Private Letter Ruling 9623011, the second ruling,
Corporation A owned 100% of Corporation B, Hospital A-i, Hospital A-2,
and other unspecified "health care facilities." Corporation B owned 100% of
Hospital B. Collectively, the several entities were referred to as Group A. A
second group, referred to as Group C, contained Corporation D which owned
100% of Corporation C. Corporation C owned 100% of Hospital C-i,
Hospital C-2 and also unspecified "health care facilities." Figure I (page 579)
graphically illustrates the corporate structures of the two groups prior to
entering into the joint operating agreement.

44. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-14-011 (Dec. 24, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24,
1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-011 (Feb. 29, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-09-011 (Nov. 22, 1995).
Since the first four rulings were issued, the Service has approved joint operating agreements
with almost verbatim boilerplate language. See supra note 9 and the subsequent private letter
rulings cited therein.
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According to the facts provided in the ruling, both groups operated
within the same geographical area. Thus, several relevant assumptions
concerning the operating environment might be safely accepted. First, there
existed substantial duplication of services within the geographical area. Many
of the health services available from hospitals within Group A were also
available from hospitals in Group C. Second, the competition between the
two groups in the same geographical area increased the labor costs associated
with staff physicians, nurses, technicians, administrators and staff. Third, the
collective capacities of the two groups was greater than overall demand for
health care. Fourth, the added effect of available health care from for-profit
hospitals served to aggravate the earlier stated factors and all four factors
resulted in increased costs to patients. The ruling does not explicitly
acknowledge these assumptions but states that the parties proposed the joint
operating agreement to unify and enhance health care services, and eliminate
duplicate services
in order to achieve cost efficiencies and improve health
45
care access.

45. In the most recently approved joint operating agreement, the hospitals confirmed
the adverse consequences by an independent study which identified areas of potential savings.
Tracy & Lewis, supra note 43, at 449. The macroeconomic factors which make the listed
assumptions more acute than they would otherwise be generally revolve around the federal
government's efforts to impose cost controls on escalating health care costs. Cost control is
the essence of "managed care" and is generally achieved through greater scrutiny of the need
for certain health care services and shorter hospital stays. The "tools" of managed care include
"preadmission certification" of need for services, controlling the length of hospital stays and
close supervision and management of acute or long term care. See Paul B. Ginsburg & Jeremy
D. Pickreign, Tracking Health Care Costs, 15 Health Affairs 140, 148 (1996); see also James
J. McGovern, Restructured Nonprofit Hospitals, 16 Tax Notes 405 (1987). As operating costs
increased, government support decreased. James J. McGovern, The IRS Compliance Program
for Nonprofit Hospitals, 16 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 201 (1997). The result was an effort to
maintain viability by controlling costs through consolidation efforts, including actual mergers
and acquisitions, and increased competition for patient revenue. Since health care costs remain
relatively static in the new "managed care" environment, volume and efficiency has become
more important. Thus hospitals, both for- and not-for-profit, have also been forced to compete
for physician and staff support. See Gary J. Young et al., Does The Sale of Nonprofit
Hospitals Threaten Health Care for the Poor, 16 Health Affairs 137 (1997); McGovern, The
IRS Compliance Program for Nonprofit Hospitals, supra. Two commentators have cataloged
the macroeconomic factors given in requests for IRS approval of joint ventures between
exempt hospitals and nonexempt hospitals. These factors include (1) price competition
resulting from a shift in government policies regarding reimbursements for medical care, (2)
impact of managed care on cost of health care delivery to employers and other third party
payers, (3) increased working capital needs, (4) providing new health care or maintaining
present health care to a community, (5) increased efficiency and reduced financial risk, and
(6) expanding opportunities to specialized cases in order to further medical education. Korman
& Gaske, supra note 25, at 1575.
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The adverse consequences resulting from the status quo might have
been mitigated within each group and without affecting each participant's
separate tax exempt status by resort to the integral part doctrine. Under that
doctrine, a subsidiary which provides otherwise commercial type services,
such as billing, laundry, or food service, to a parent organization may achieve
or maintain tax exempt status and will not be considered as engaging in an
unrelated activity, provided the commercial type services are activities in
which the parent itself could have engaged without carrying on an unrelated
business activity. 46 The basic rationale is that if the parent could conduct the
activity without adverse tax consequences, it should not suffer these
consequences simply because nontax considerations lead the parent to conduct
the activity through a subsidiary.47 The performance of services by the
subsidiary is viewed merely as the shifting of income and activity from one
department within an entity to another.4 8 To ignore this reality, by denying
tax exempt status, would unnecessarily interfere with the sound business
practice which presumably led to the establishment of the subsidiary.49
The Service's integral part doctrine has a number of distinctions
relating to the relationship of the service provider and recipient of the
services; some of these distinctions are rejected by or absent from judicial
opinions.5" In addition to the provision of services to a parent, a subsidiary
may provide services to other exempt entities but only if they have the same
parent corporation as the service-providing subsidiary. The rationale stated
earlier is not violated by allowing sister organizations to consolidate since
each are performing services ultimately for the benefit of a single parent
which could have performed the service itself. A subsidiary corporation,
though, cannot perform services for an organization with whom the subsidiary
does not share a common parent even if the service-recipient organization

46. Regs. § 1.502-1(b).
47. Id. Whether the parent could have engaged in the activity itself is a determination made under IRC § 513. See supra note 24. If the subsidiary's activity is substantially
related to the parent's accomplishment of the parent's exempt goals, Regs. § 1.502-1(b) will
allow the subsidiary to be granted tax exempt status.
48. Rev. Rul. 38-51, 1938-2 C.B. 166 ("PV]hat a corporation. exempt under [IRC
§ 501(c)(3)].. ., may do directly without forfeiting its right to exemption, it may do through
a corporation organized for that purpose, and... a corporation so organized and operated is
entitled to exemption.").
49. Regs. § 1.502-1(b) ("[E]xemption will not be lost because, as a matter of
accounting between the two organizations, the subsidiary derives a profit from its dealing with
its parent.").
50. This portion of the article focuses on Regs. § 1.502-1(b) to demonstrate how the
joint operating agreement requirement is derived from this regulation. In Part IV,the article
discusses the judicial rejection (but not overruling) of some of Regs. § 1.502-1(b)'s distinctions
and therefore the invalidity of the joint operating agreement requirement.
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performs a similar charitable service as the service-provider or the serviceprovider's parent organization.5 Nor may the subsidiary corporation perform
services for multiple parent organizations even though the multiple parents
share similar charitable goals. 2 The one point on which Regulations section
1.502-1(b) is consistent with the judicial articulation of the integral part
doctrine is in the regulation's recognition that a formal parent-subsidiary
corporate structure is not absolutely necessary. Instead, both the serviceproviding and service-recipient organizations must only be in a "close and
intimate" relationship with a common parent-type organization, i.e., an
organization exercising some degree of control over, but not necessarily
having a formal ownership relationship with all the other organizations
involved. 53 The distinctions made by the regulation, together with its acceptance of less than a formal parent-subsidiary relationship collectively result
in the necessity and applicability, respectively, of joint operating agreements.
Thus, within Group A of Private Letter Ruling 9623011, Hospital A-1
may provide administrative and medical support services to any other
participant within the group. In this manner, Group A and likewise Group C
could achieve some degree of consolidation and mitigate the adverse
consequences discussed above, and no doubt did so. But neither Hospital A- I
nor Hospital C-i, for example, could provide services to one another or to
any other hospital within the opposite group without engaging in an unrelated
business activity. Hence, duplication of services, increased labor costs,
capacity in excess of need and the resulting increased costs to patients is only
partially mitigated through separate application of the integral part doctrine
to the two groups as illustrated in Figure 1 (page 579).
To fully alleviate the adverse consequences using the integral part
doctrine, the two groups would have to submit to the control of a common
parent or parent-like organization. Then, the sharing of resources and services
would fit within the analogy of merely shifting income and functions between
several departments of a single entity. The resulting agreement therefore
created a third corporation, Corporation E, which possessed governance and
managerial authority over all participating hospitals. Figure 2 (page 583)
illustrates the corporate structure after the joint operating agreement.

51. Regs. § 1.502-1(b)(2) ("An exempt organization is not related to another exempt
organization merely because they both engage in the same type of exempt activities.").
52. Id.
53. The regulation does not state this rule explicitly but it has been so interpreted
by the Service. See Rev. Rul. 81-19, 1981-1 C.B. 353; Rev. Rul. 76-336, 1976-2 C.B. 143.
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The authority ceded to Corporation E, the consolidation entity,
included the right to review and approve strategic plans, manage network participants and establish overall operating procedures. Ownership and liabilities
of each participant, however, remained unchanged. Corporation E also lacked
any real authority over the financial integration of the parties. Instead, the net
revenues were distributed to the participants according to a formula which
required the two groups to make annual payments to each other. 54 The
amount of the payments were based upon the value of assets and excess
revenue potential contributed by each party, with more weight assigned to the
value of assets contributed. The actual ratios and assigned weights given to
them, however, would not be subject to change as a result of any participant's
future performance. The implication is that the weights and ratios could be
changed for noncompetitive reasons. Thus, although financial authority was
lacking, financial integration was still achieved. No participant would have
a competitive motivation vis-a-vis another participant to make capital
contributions or increase its patient base. Instead, the success of any one
participant would be tied to the success of all other participants. The joint

54. Network Participants effectively accomplish financial integration
through annual payments between Group A and Group C. The amount of
payment will be based upon a weighted average of two ratios each
determinable as of a financial statement date described in the [joint
operating agreement]. One ratio is based upon the fair market value of the
assets of Group A and the assets of Group C, plus or minus (as appropriate) certain specified assets or liabilities. The other ratio is based on the
average excess of revenues over expenditures for the four most recently
completed fiscal years of Group A and Group C prior to the execution of
the [joint operating agreement]. The amount of weight given to each ratio
will vary over a term of years with a declining weight given to the income
ratio and an increasing weight given to the asset ratio.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-011 (February 29, 1996).
55. Once the [joint operating agreement] is effective, neither the ratios nor
the weighted averages will be adjusted because of the future performance
of any network participant. Thus, there will be no financial incentive for
any Network Participant to encourage the use of services at, or to make
capital additions to, any particular facility and a Network Participant
performing a service pursuant to the [joint operating agreement] will not
receive any separate profit or benefit for rendering the service. Similarly,
corporate and administrative services performed by any Network Participant will financially benefit any particular Network Participant only insofar
as all Network Participants benefit from efficient performances of these
services.
Id. It is difficult to visualize the actual methodology used to achieve financial integration. See
supra note 54. But it is easier to conclude from the above quote and an understanding of Regs.
§ 1.502-1(b) that financial integration means that the parties must achieve the same
cooperative, noncompetitive relationship as that which would result from an actual merger.
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operating agreement thus resulted in the structure of a parent organization,
Corporation E, having most of the attributes of ownership over, without
actually owning, all the other participants. Under the integral part theory
discussed above, then, any one of the participants could provide services to
any other participant without engaging in an unrelated activity or otherwise
jeopardizing the service-providing participant's tax exempt status. One
hospital could provide billing services for the others, another could provide
food service, another legal and yet another could provide payroll and labor
management services. The consolidation entity could provide any of these
services for any participant. This consolidation within and between both
groups more fully alleviates the adverse consequences resulting from the
duplication of services existing prior to the joint operating agreement and
ultimately benefits the commonly shared charitable beneficiaries.'
One significant difference between the parent-subsidiary model of
prior rulings and the typical joint operating agreement is that authority and
control are ceded from the parents to the "subsidiary." What might appear to
be a subordinate entity is, in actuality, a superior entity which exercises
governance, managerial and financial control over the creating entities.
Traditionally, the integral part theory is applicable to a subordinate entity
which engages in some activity which its exempt parent organization could
itself perform without adverse consequences." In joint operating agreements,
the integral part doctrine is applied in reverse order. As far as the integral
part doctrine is relevant, the parent gains its exemption through the activity

56. A recent study demonstrates that 1990 administrative expenses accounted for
approximately 25% of overall hospital spending in the United States, more than twice the
percentage spent by Canadian hospitals. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein. Costs
of Care and Administration at For-Profit and Other Hospitals in the United States, 336 The
New Eng. J. Med. 769 (1997). The United States amount increased to 26% by 1994.
Curiously, 1994 administrative costs accounted for 34% of spending by for-profit hospitals but
only 24.5% of spending for not-for-profit hospitals. Id. at 770. The study included the
following activities in the definition of "administrative": Administrative and General as defined
by Medicare regulations, nursing administration, central services and supplies, medical records
and library, employee-benefits department (salary costs only), administrative and general home
health, skilled-nursing facility utilization review. Id. at 771. The study included the following
activities as "mixed administrative and clinical": capital-related costs-building and fixtures,
capital-related costs-movable equipment, employee benefits (except benefits-department
salaries), maintenance and repairs, operation of plant, and debt-service. Id. With hospital
administrative costs comprising one-quarter of nonprofit hospital spending, there is certainly
incentive and need for consolidation.
57. See McGovern, supra note 45, at 405, 411. ("This structure suggests that the
basis for the integral part theory of exemption is the control vested in the tax-exempt parent
over the activities of its subsidiary. The relationships of organizations within the reorganized
hospital system, however, are the inverse of that suggested by the regulations. It is the parent
organization seeking to derive its exemption from subsidiary organizations.")
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of its subordinate organization. If the "close and intimate relationship" exists,
however, granting tax exempt status to the parent does not violate the
substantive notion that income and functions are merely shifted from one
department to another within a single entity. 8 Logically, that notion is more
important than the hierarchy between the parties.
Private Letter Ruling 9651047 contains the Service's most comprehensive discussion of the factors leading to approval of a joint operating
agreement.59 The facts of that ruling, prior to the implementation of the joint
operating agreement, demonstrated a greater degree of duplication of services
and a corresponding increased severity of adverse consequences than in other
rulings. Unlike the prior rulings, none of the five hospitals involved in Private
Letter Ruling 9651047 belonged to a health care network prior to the joint
operating agreement. 60 Instead, each participant was a stand-alone hospital
and each provided similar services all within the Cincinnati, Ohio area. 6'
Thus, the integral part doctrine was unavailable to allow even the partial
consolidation of services.
The Service's approval of the resulting joint operating agreement in
the Private Letter Ruling 9651047 indicates that the facts and circumstances
approach allows for more than one method to achieve the level of integration
necessary to the application of the integral part doctrine. Particularly, the
parties demonstrated a much greater degree of centralized government
management, and financial integration than in other rulings. 62 To a much

58. See Regs. § 1.502-1(b).
59. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24, 1996).
60. The ruling does not identify the hospitals involved in the agreement. Thanks,
however, are owed to Ms. Kathleen Bruvold, Associate General Counsel for the University of
Cincinnati, for providing the author with a copy of the agreement. Amended and Restated Joint
Operating Agreement among The Christ Hospital and University of Cincinnati and The St.
Luke Hospitals, Inc. and Jewish Health System, Inc. and The Health Alliance of Greater
Cincinnati (Jan. 1, 1996) (on file with The FloridaTax Review) [hereinafter Greater Cincinnati
Joint Operating Agreement.] Certain provisions of the agreement are reproduced verbatim in
the footnotes which follow.
61. The hospital participants are: The Christ Hospital, a 501(c)(3) organization
having its principle offices in Cincinnati, Ohio, The University of Cincinnati Hospital, a state
agency having its principle offices in Cincinnati, Ohio, The College of Medicine of the
University of Cincinnati, also a state agency having its principle offices in Cincinnati, Ohio,
St. Luke's Hospital, a 501(c)(3) organization having its principle offices in Ft. Thomas,
Kentucky, and Jewish Health Systems, Inc., a 501(c)(3) organization having its principle
offices in Cincinnati, Ohio. Greater Cincinnati Joint Operating Agreement, supra note 60, at
73.
62. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24, 1996). Article III of the Greater Cincinnati
Joint Operating Agreement, supra note 60, at 14-15, provides:
3.3.
Role of the Joint Operating Company Board. The JOC Board, subject to
certain powers reserved to the Participating Entities, shall have responsibil-
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greater extent than other rulings, the overall facts support the conclusion that
the five formally separate hospitals achieved an "all for one, one for all"
relationship such that competitive motivations between the participants would
be preempted by cooperative motivation. The result, as in prior and
subsequent rulings, was the unification of services and conservation of funds
to the benefit of shared charitable beneficiaries.6 3

ity for the overall management and supervision of the JOC and its
activities, including but not limited to the operation of the Alliance, in
furtherance of the purposes set forth in the Articles of Incorporation.
including but not limited to the power to:
3.3(a). Establish appropriate policies and strategic direction to enable the Alliance
to function as an integrated health care delivery system providing a full
range of health care services without regard to race, creed, color, national
origin or economic status;
3.3(b). Facilitate cooperative and collaborative efforts by and among the
Participating Entities with respect to the provision of health care services,
including but not limited to efforts to enhance existing health care delivery
facilities and systems and establish efficient and economical systems of
health care delivery operating on an integrated basis and providing a
continuum of care;
Reduce the cost of the delivery of health care services and otherwise effect
3.3(c).
efficiencies and economies of scale in the delivery of health care services
by the Participating Entities;
3.3(d). Enhance the health status of the community by developing and offering
new and/or expanded health care services, including but not limited to
wellness programs, preventative health initiatives and services, and
community and patient need and satisfaction assessments:
3.3(e). Govern the Alliance and provide health care services in a non-discriminatory manner for the benefit of all persons in the community, including the
indigent and those persons whose care is paid for in whole or in part
through government sponsored programs such as Medicare or Medicaid;
Develop, promote, operate and/or support educational and scientific
3.3(f).
research activities and programs through the Alliance in furtherance of the
general health of the communities served by the Alliance:
3.3(g). Review and approve financial and strategic plans and operating and capital
budgets for the Alliance to be developed and implemented by JOC
management, including issuance of all debt:
3.3(h). Enter into contracts on behalf of the Participating Entities with respect to
the organization and operation of the Alliance;
Hire, evaluate and compensate the JOC CEO and participate in the
3.3(i).
selection of the other senior management of the Alliance: and
Do all other things necessary and appropriate to carry out the duties and
3.3(j).
responsibilities of the JOC in governing, managing and operating the
Alliance and achieving its strategic goals consistent with the terms and
conditions of this Agreement.
63. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24. 1996). Article I1of the Greater Cincinnati
Joint Operating Agreement, supra note 60, at 12, states:
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The consolidation entity created in Private Letter Ruling 9651047 has
virtually all the power and authority over the five participants that a single
governing board would have over its own single institution. For example, the
consolidation entity has the authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the
entire system or any one of the participants. It also has authority to formulate
strategic and financial plans, direct which hospital would perform which
service, reassign assets from one hospital to another, coordinate the practices
of the hospitals' staff physicians, and establish budgets for the hospitals. 64
Additionally, the consolidation entity's chief executive officer serves as the
chief executive officer for each of the five participating hospitals.65 Unlike
the prior and subsequent rulings, however, this ruling did not involve a
formalistic method of annualized payments between the participants. Instead,
the consolidation entity has the authority to retain all net revenues and direct
them to any facility within the system as the system's needs dictate.' Thus
the consolidation entity has financial governance authority greater than that
in other rulings. The Service reviewed the facts in great detail and concluded
that the consolidation entity qualified for tax exempt status and that any party
to the joint operating agreement could transfer assets, resources and personnel
to any other party without jeopardizing its tax exempt status or engaging in

2.2.

Strategic Goals. The Alliance will accomplish its mission by achieving the
following strategic goals:
2.2(a). To enhance the ability of the Participating Entities to respond to health
care needs of the communities served by the Participating Entities by
creating an integrated health care delivery system serving Ohio, Kentucky
and Indiana, developing a primary care network, and developing the
necessary infrastructure and information systems to more effectively
manage the delivery of health care to enrolled populations.
2.2(b). To reduce the costs of health care providers participating in the Alliance,
and the ultimate cost of health care to the communities served by the
Alliance.
2.2(c).
To improve the quality of educational programs offered by the Participating Entities through continual support of the teaching and research activities of the Participating Entities, focusing resources and expanding primary
care training venues and modalities, and as otherwise provided herein.
2.2(d). To enhance the general health status of the communities by developing the
capabilities to manage enrollee health care costs through risk-sharing
arrangements including capitation; offering new methods of health care
delivery including wellness, preventative health initiatives and patient
satisfaction measures; and maintaining a commitment to provide care
(subject to the availability of resources) on a nondiscriminatory basis to
the indigent and those whose health care is paid for, in whole or in part,
by any governmental program, including Medicare and Medicaid.
64. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24, 1996).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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an unrelated business activity.67 The parties were therefore able to achieve
complete consolidation.
The resulting merger in Private Letter Ruling 9651047 was more
actual than virtual, since the consolidation entity exercised almost all the
attributes of ownership over assets, legal title to which remained with the
participants. That fact leaves one to wonder about the degree of integration
that the Service's facts and circumstances test actually requires. A synthesis
of the rulings certainly suggests that at a minimum the parties must achieve
a codependent/cooperative rather than competitive/duplicative relationship.
But if the degree of integration in the third ruling is now the standard or even
a safe harbor, there is little difference between a virtual and actual merger,
the latter of which the parties presumably disdained for sound nontax
operating reasons. Hence, the joint operating agreement requirement, at least
as demonstrated by the third ruling, results in the law's coming full circle
from a point at which an actual parent-subsidiary relationship need not exist
to the requirement that such a relationship be proven even while the parties
disdain and deny its existence.
The overall conceptualization of joint operating agreements begs the
question not whether the virtual merger requirement is sensibly imposed from
a tax policy standpoint, but whether actual or virtual mergers are sensible
alternatives to the simple creation of a mutually-owned captive subsidiary or
mutual cooperation between exempt organizations. Certainly, approval ofjoint
operating agreements represents the Service's grant of relief to entities who
need to consolidate but who do not wish to effect an actual merger. But joint
operating agreements, vis-a-vis mutual subsidiaries, are as burdensome and
complex as actual mergers and hence provide little or no relief for those
exempt organizations who, for sound operating reasons, do not wish to
actually merge but still need to eliminate duplication of services. The need,
moreover, is caused by the Service's prohibition of mutual subsidiaries under
Regulations section 1.502-1(b)'s articulation of the integral part theory, not
from an apparently logical limitation of choices to mergers on the one hand,
and debilitating and wasteful duplication of services on the other. None of the
rulings or internal training material, though, address the necessity for the
complexity engendered by joint operating agreements. In fact, the emergence
of joint operating agreements is notable for the lack of any real policy
discussion beyond the way these agreements work. Such a discussion is
necessary and should first acknowledge the problem of complexity in tax law
and how joint operating agreements contribute to that complexity, and then
examine the policy reasons, if any, which justify the complexity particular to
joint operating agreements.

67. Id.
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MI. THE BANE OF COMPLEXITY

There is no great revelation in the recognition that the tax code, along
with its interpretive byproducts, is massive, complex, and massively
complex.68 In fact, any statement concerning the tax code's complexity
necessarily falls in the category of understatement since no single scholar can
accurately measure the infinitesimal nature of the code's complexity. Nevertheless, several scholars have identified particular aspects of the complexity
with both elegance and analytical acuity. 69 Although the problem is stated
differently and only by way of anecdotal examples, commentators and indeed
the courts 70 generally accept the notion that tax law is simply too complex.
The manifestation of complexity, oddly enough, can be summarized
in a few easily understood statements. First, complexity is manifested in the

inability of taxpayers and tax collectors to arrive at a "reasonably certain
conclusion [concerning a transaction] despite diligent and expert research.'
This first type of complexity might generally be stated as an inability to know
the law. The most immediate cause of this form of complexity, although
certainly not the only cause, is the shear length of the code. 72 Even a
straight line between two points can be confusing if one cannot know where
to start or when to stop. If nothing else, the code's volume creates anxiety

68. Defining "complex" is itself a complex exercise. The American Heritage College
Dictionary seems to have the tax code in mind when defining "complex." It uses a list of
synonyms in the following discussion:
These adjectives mean having parts so interconnected as to make the whole perplexing. Complex implies a combination of many associated parts ....Complicated
stresses elaborate relationship of parts ....Intricate refers to a pattern of intertwining parts that is difficult to follow or analyze ....Involved stresses confusion
arising from the commingling of parts and the consequent difficulty of separating
them ....Tangled strongly suggests the random twisting of many parts ....Knotty
stresses intellectual complexity leading to difficulty of solution or comprehension.
The American Heritage College Dictionary 285 (3d ed. 1993).
69. See Eustice, supra note 4; Pollock, supra note 4; Roberts et al., supra note 4;
Sawyer, supra note 4; Surrey, supra note 4; White, supra note 4.
70. The courts have, on occasion, noted or decried the complexity even in the
provisions relating to tax exempt organizations. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 596-99 (1983); Windsor Foundation v. U.S. 77-2 USTC (CCH) T 9,709 (E.D. Vir.
1977) ("On the basis of the congressional enactment, 26 U.S.C. § 501, et seq., the Internal
Revenue Service has drafted fantastically intricate and detailed regulations in an attempt to
thwart the fantastically intricate and detailed efforts of taxpayers to obtain private benefits
from foundations while avoiding the imposition of taxes."). For a compilation of judicial
statements concerning the code's complexity see, Katz, supra note 4.
71. Roberts et al., supra note 4, at 327.
72. One commentator notes that the code and regulations consisted of a single
volume of approximately 400 pages in 1913, but, by 1994, the code and regulations took up
eight volumes and consisted of more than 36,000 pages. Pollock, supra note 4, at 320 n.3.
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which in real terms translates into delay and expense as practitioners are
forced to consider and then apply or discard, as the case may be, the many
different cross-referenced provisions which may be relevant to a transaction.
Second, complexity is manifested in the inability to achieve a reasonably
certain conclusion except after an inordinate expenditure of time and
money." This type of complexity can be summarized as an inability to
afford the law. Being unable to afford knowledge of the law is too often the
case with provisions which are intended to narrow the path to a desirable
result, i.e., anti-abuse provisions. 74 Third, a conclusion might be knowable
with or without much time or effort, but implementation may require an
inordinate amount of time and money, or an inordinate change in operating
practices. In other words, the tax rule might be easily found and stated, but
its substance requires involved or detailed changes in operating practice,
which would otherwise not be undertaken. This type of complexity is best
described as "transactional complexity" because the tax rule is easy enough
to determine but difficult to implement." Each of the three types of
complexity, but the third most of all, violate the accepted notion that tax rules
should be neutral and "not distort the economy or the efforts" of those subject
to the rules.76 Thus, in all respects and however crude it may sound,
complexity is defined by reference to time and money. Too much time and
too much money must be diverted to tax compliance and away from the
purpose of the taxpayer's principle endeavors.
Congress is foremost amongst the list of usual suspects responsible
for tax complexity. 77 It is faulted for several reasons, including the apparently opposite assertions that statutes are written much too ambiguously78 and
with too much detail and specificity. 79 This criticism might be reconciled by

73. Roberts et al., supra note 4, at 327.
74. See, e.g., IRC §§ 469, 1272-1275, 7872.
75. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 Tax L. Rev. 25, 46 (1989) ("For one thing, factoring tax considerations into business
decisions can be expected to complicate decision making, creating transactional complexity.").
76. Eustice, supra note 4, at 10.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Pollock, supra note 4, at 339 (discussing vague and overly-broad language).
79. Eustice, supra note 4, at 10 ("But surely the charitable deduction section, a
provision commonly used by taxpayers with widely varying levels of expertise in statutory
analysis, is not worthy of a 13-page provision in the Code, but there it is."): see also Dunn,
supra note 6, at 321. Dunn states:
[A] full and detailed legislative solution is not only enormously complicating, but it allows taxpayers to develop schemes and plans to avoid the
legislative purpose when that purpose is set forth in precise and detailed
statutory language. This, in turn, as noted above, leads to further
legislative responses .... Because such legislation is necessarily complicated and detailed, it is normally very difficult for taxpayers, their advisors
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the notion that it ought to be possible to draft a statute in broad general terms
and still adequately identify the consequences of a particular transaction, or
favored/disfavored transactions, without including the degree of specificity
which gives the code its impenetrability.8" The use of overly specific
language merely expresses a lack of confidence in the judiciary's role in
interpreting tax provisions. It co-opts the judiciary's role by stating a rule and
determining a result in a fact situation far too specific to be reasonably
injected into a statute. 1 Courts too often accede to this subordination by
stating that the code's complexity necessitates the judiciary's acceptance of
a passive role.82 This accession by the courts only reinforces the result. The
Code becomes increasingly specific, i.e., complex, as the judiciary become
more and more reluctant to interpret or analyze these tax provisions
ostensibly because of their complexity.

and tax administrators to understand and implement such legislation. Such
complex tax legislation presents taxpayers, tax professionals, and tax
administrators with enormous compliance problems and not infrequently
leads to a general disregard and disrespect for such legislation.
Id.
80. The danger to this observation and the catch-22 for drafters, at least with respect
to regulations, is that if a regulation is drafted too generally, it may be struck down as
unconstitutionally vague. See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (finding the definition of "educational" in Regs. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) unconstitutionally
vague.) But IRC § 61 is a good example of legislative drafting that is general, yet with the
assistance of the judiciary, has a generally understood and agreed upon meaning. Professor
Eustice argues that drafting statutes and regulations in general terms does not solve the
complexity problem but merely shifts the problem to another branch-from the legislative and
executive to the judiciary. Eustice, supra note 4, at 10-11. But one of the problems of statutory
detail is that it discourages the simplification of tax laws through the application of trial and
error that is most appropriate to the executive and judicial branches. Courts seem most
reluctant to offer the benefit of interpretation under a sharply focused set of facts when the
statute is long and cumbersome, trusting instead that the detail is in the statute and the
executive branch knows the detail best.
81. See generally Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code:
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 819 (1991); Karla
W. Simon, Constitutional Implications of the Tax Legislative Process, 10 Am. J. Tax Pol'y
235 (1992) [hereinafter Simon, Constitutional Implications]; Karla W. Simon, Congress and
Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 1005 (1991) [hereinafter
Simon, Congress and Taxes].
82. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983). But see
Simon, supra note 80, at 244 ("The rules developed by the Treasury and the Service will tend
not to reflect the wishes of special interest groups. As a result, courts by and large may defer
to Treasury and Internal Revenue Service rules and regulations without fear that the process
of their adoption has been tainted ... ").
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Another criticism not as often mentioned as a source of complexity
is Congress' excessive reliance on nonstatutory legislative material."z By
using committee reports and other nonstatutory material to express substantive
tax law, Congress contributes to both the inability to know and the ability to
afford the law in procedural and substantive ways. From a procedural
standpoint, the use of nonstatutory legislative material contributes to the
diffusion of authority which makes tax practice so time consuming,
unscientific and expensive relative to other areas of law. In addition to
statutes, regulations, revenue rulings and judicial opinions, practitioners must
also find and decipher various committee reports, post-enactment explanations
and any number of other bits and pieces from the legislative process.'
Substantively, nonstatutory legislative material contributes to tax complexity
because it raises serious questions of authority. Since it is enacted, if at all,
entirely outside of the constitutional process,ss committee reports and the
like are of dubious value. Yet, however dubious and obscure it may be, a
piece of legislative history regarding a particular transaction can be ignored
only at the taxpayer's peril.8 6

83. See Livingston, supra note 81, at 847 ("[Tlhe use of legislative history results
in an unnecessary expenditure of time and money, and lawyers (and perhaps some judges) lack
the ability to interpret and apply such history correctly.").
84. For a good discussion of the difficulties of finding and then interpreting the
mass of tax legislative history created by Congress and the interpretive statements issued by
the Service, see Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing With the "Authorities": Determining Valid Legal
Authority In Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding
Penalties, 66 Taxes 1072, 1075-1133 (1988).
85. See Simon, Constitutional Implications, supra note 81. at 256. Professor Simon
states:
By elevating legislative history to the level of a statute and giving the
materials as much deference as is given to the words of a statute, Congress
would be writing laws without going through the normal political process.
And it would be stealing power from the executive by telling it how to
write rules and from the judiciary by telling it how it must interpret them.
This is something the courts should not readily permit....
Id.
86. A simple case demonstrates the proposition. In Porten v. Commissioner. 65
T.C.M. (CCH) 1994 (1993), a student sought relief from the realization of income from the
discharge of a student loan under IRC § 108(f)(1). IRC § 108(f)(1) provides relief from
realization if the discharge is made conditional upon the student's agreement to work "for a
certain period of time in certain professions for any of a broad class of employers." The postenactment legislative history known as the "Bluebook" amongst tax practitioners, limits the
"certain professionals" to medicine, nursing, and teaching, although the limitation is not stated
in the statute or regulations. Staff of The Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., General
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1994, at 1200 (Joint
Comm. Print 1985). The Court, though, adopted the post-enactment legislative history and
relied upon it to deny relief to the student. Porten. 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1996.
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The Treasury Department, too, is faulted for its role in creating
unnecessary complexity. Unlike Congress, Treasury's role can be summarizedby reference to a fiscal stinginess, which is entirely appropriate, but which is
too often manifested by an overly cautious and sometimes obsessive approach
to substantive questions of tax law.8 7 Final regulations, for example, are
routinely enacted years after they are initially proposed, apparently as a result
of a fear of expressing a binding (upon the Service) interpretation lest the
interpretation leave room for abuse.8 Treasury's obsessive characteristics are
most demonstrated, frankly, by an inability or unwillingness to take "no" for
an answer when to do so would be both reasonable and provide needed
certainty to an issue. This is particularly true with respect to judicial decisions
with which the Treasury disagrees and, despite well reasoned opinions,
continues to litigate.89 That the Treasury might continue to litigate a point
encourages a disrespect for the judiciary's role in tax jurisprudence and
increases the transactional burdens, i.e., the complexity, of a related
transaction since the taxpayer must factor in the risk of future litigation. One
final example of treasury's stinginess concerns the length of time the Service
takes to issue technical advice and private rulings to taxpayers, who, being
unable to safely conclude a transaction due to already existing complexity,
must invariably seek prior approval from the Service. This latter result, the
necessity to obtain prior IRS approval, might appropriately be called the
"reverse tax lottery." The tax lottery is said to occur when, because tax laws
are so complex and the stakes in a particular transaction are relatively low,

87. Eustice, supra note 4, at 14 ("[T]he Treasury has been excessively concerned
with the fisc-some have even called this fiscal paranoia-the fact that they might lose a
dollar of revenue if they ever gave in on something."); Roberts et al., supra note 4, at 36
("[T]he Treasury has sometimes been obsessed with the fear of possible tax abuse by some
and consequently has pushed for provisions which lean too far in the direction of specificity
and complexity.").
88. For example, the Service proposed regulations to interpret IRC § 117 on June
9, 1988. Prop. Regs. § 1.117-6. Almost ten years later, the regulations have still not been
enacted in final form. Likewise, the Service initially proposed regulations to interpret IRC
§ 125 on May 7, 1984. Prop. Regs. § 1.125-1. Those regulations have also not been enacted
in final form. On the other hand, temporary regulations interpreting IRC § 170(f)(8) were
issued on May 27, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 27458 (May 27, 1994). Final regulations regarding IRC
§ 170(f)(8) were issued on December 16, 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 65,946 (Dec. 16, 1996).
89. Even after a string of defeats and partial victories with respect to the definition
of "royalty" for purposes of IRC § 512(b)(2), including a well-reasoned opinion by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Service continues to challenge the definition as it might apply
to proceeds from "affinity" credit cards. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d. 1526
(9th Cir. 1996); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 60 (1990), rev'd, 942 F.2d
309 (6th Cir. 1991); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Oregon State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1935 (1996); see also
Mississippi State Univ. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-397.
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a taxpayer takes a position that is probably unjustified but unlikely to be
challenged by the Service. 90 The reverse tax lottery is the opposite; the
inability to come to a "reasonably certain conclusion" coupled with the
relatively high value of the transaction requires that the taxpayer always seek
the Service's prior review and approval. The result of the reverse tax lottery
is an increase in time and money necessarily diverted from the principle
endeavor.
Complexity, of course, is an elusive and relative concept. Rules and
regulations applicable to any endeavor necessarily increase the number of
discrete tasks which must be achieved to accomplish the endeavor. In the tax
exempt arena, for example, there is a basic endeavor, providing charitable
goods and services, which is accomplished through a basic subsidy, tax
exemption. To that basic subsidy, though, is attached certain other rules and
regulations generally involving prohibitions against the use of tax exemption
for unfair competition, 9' private profit 92 or political purposes.9" Thus the
basic endeavor is complicated by the necessity to accomplish the tasks
dictated by the added rules and regulations. These added rules and regulations, being directed to real possibilities of human nature, have never been
seriously questioned and indeed are viewed as necessary and worth the added
complexity-worth the diversion of time and money from the provision of
charitable goods and services. That is, the benefits of the rules and regulations outweigh the diversion of time and money from the basic endeavor
because without the rules and regulations there is the real possibility that even
more time and money might be diverted from the subsidized goal by those
who would engage in profit taking or political advocacy. Thus, the question
in any case is not merely whether a particular tax rule or regulation increases
complexity. Invariably rules and regulations do so. The question is whether
the benefits of the rule or regulation outweigh the diversion of time and
money from the basic endeavor.
With regard to joint operating agreements, the inquiry involves an
identification of the benefits obtained by adherence to the complexities

90. Roberts et al., supra note 4, at 330. Roberts states:
The "appallingly complicated" tax law, the inadequacy of audits by the
Service, the manpower of the Service devoted to complexity. the
impracticality of training revenue agents to achieve expertness in the
morass of the existing tax law and the flexibility available to the taxpayer
in legitimately resolving to his own advantage the numerous doubtful
issues resulting from those complexities, all serve to turn the income tax
return of the affluent taxpayer into a lottery....
Id.
91. IRC §§ 502, 511.
92. IRC § 501(c)(3).
93. Id.
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engendered. And because the complexity is indeed a relative concept, it is
also relevant to compare the joint operating agreement model to other forms
of achieving the consolidation goal which ultimately benefit the more
effective delivery of charitable goods and services ("the basic endeavor"). The
result of this inquiry will answer the question whether joint operating
agreements are unnecessarily complex impositions on tax exempt organizations.
The basic endeavor of joint operating agreements is the consolidation
of services, reduction in overhead costs and the resulting delivery of greater
portions of the charitable fisc to charitable beneficiaries. Joint operating
agreements accomplish this goal by eliminating the practical requirement that
several different nonprofit hospitals within a general area and having the
same or substantially similar goals each offer identical services. Consolidation
is achieved because different tasks are undertaken by one hospital for the
benefit and use of the others, rather than several hospitals each undertaking
the same tasks for their own benefits.
To achieve this consolidation without adverse tax consequences, a
joint operating agreement requires completion of several incremental tasks.94
Foremost, the several hospitals must negotiate and agree upon basic
philosophical goals and embody these goals in an overall constitutional
document.95 Since the essential aspect of a joint operating agreement is the
formation of and acquiescence of power to a consolidation entity, the several
participants must somehow coordinate their individual philosophies into a
single articulation which, in turn, will be assumed by the consolidation
entity.96 Although several hospitals may appear functionally identical to one
another, religious, historical, educational, public and private affiliations and
commitments make the coordination process both sensitive and time

94. See generally Hollis, supra note 25, at 131-33.
95. One hospital consultant lists twelve different areas which hospital boards must
coordinate with those with whom it enters into a joint venture. Hollis, supra note 25, at 134.
Each hospital participant should be able to demonstrate or agree upon the following:
commitment to a central mission, sharing of governance, commitment to serve a certain region,
continuation of services deemed important to a particular participant, evidence of regional
exclusivity, ability to effect physician integration, ability to attract patients, ability and
willingness to undertake risky managed care contracts, employee development, financial
strength, commitment to sufficient capitalization, and demonstrated ability to achieve
economies of scale. Id.
96. The strategic rationale that leads a hospital to seek an affiliation may
be clear; the process, however, is never easy. The boards of community
hospitals typically are emotionally attached to "their" hospital, fiercely
loyal to its employees, and very concerned about their community. In
addition, boards often are highly protective of their independence and
reluctant to share control.
See, Hollis, supra note 25, at 132.
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consuming, 97 necessarily involving discussions and negotiations as to basic
points and then the more difficult task of actually articulating those basic
points in a manner politically acceptable to the participants, their individual
governing bodies and their constituents." Once agreement on a basic
philosophy is reached and sufficiently recorded, the participants must then
begin the process of completing the discrete tasks necessary to the accomplishment of the joint operating agreement.
Initially, the parties must agree upon how their individual interests
and concerns will be represented in the consolidation entity's governance
structure. The natural tendency to retain autonomy must give way to the
consolidation entity's authority over the previously independent participants.
The parties must negotiate the extent of the authority ceded to the consolidation entity, keeping in mind that too little authority will preclude the
application of the integral part doctrine, but too much authority will result in
a sacrifice of identity. The resulting agreement as to the cessation of power
is merely one part of the joint operating agreement's foundation.
A necessary next step in the process involves the creation of trust
between the parties, particularly concerning each participant's ability to
perform its role in the joint operating agreement and avoid harming another
participant's financial status. Trust is not inherent in the basic endeavor. It is
created by each hospital's governing members, in meeting their respective
fiduciary duties, obtaining and reviewing the normally confidential papers,
documents and performance histories pertaining to other participants with the
help of various auditors, consultants, and attorneys skilled in such matters.'
After having done so, and perhaps having innumerable questions and

97. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24. 1996). the parties were required to
coordinate the philosophies of a state university and medical school with three other hospitals
operating in conformance with three different religious faiths. Greater Cincinnati Joint
Operating Agreement, supra note 60. Certain hospitals in that ruling reserved the power to veto
changes effecting their abilities to provide certain services with which the hospitals were
traditionally associated. Id. In the most recently approved joint operating agreement, one
participant was owned and operated by a religious order which abided by certain policies
limiting the alienation of church property. Tracy and Lewis, supra note 43, at 455. The parties
were also required to make certain promises to the state regarding the continuation of certain
types of health care. Id.
98. The joint operating agreement in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-011 eventually dissolved
due to the participant's inability to agree upon a single leadership, operating, and managing
philosophy. David Burda, Joint Operating Agreement Gets IRS Nod, Modern Healthcare, June
17, 1996, at 6. The Greater Cincinnati Joint Operating Agreement became the subject of
litigation involving the Cincinnati City Council, the Legal Aid Society of Cincinnati and a
coalition of taxpayers all seeking to block the University of Cincinnati Hospital's conversion
from a public teaching hospital to a private nonprofit medical center. Gold, supra note 25, at
G-1.
99. See Hollis, supra note 25, at 138.

FloridaTax Review

[Vol 3:9

concerns answered through meetings and exchanges of correspondence, the
governing authorities may satisfy themselves that involvement in the virtual
merger will not adversely jeopardize their basic missions.
The similarity of the joint operating agreement to actual mergers, as
well as its involvement of entities which are essentially public trusts and, in
some cases, financed by tax exempt bond issues, necessarily requires that the
participants make statutory or regulatory notifications to state and federal
organizations having enforcement authority over certain issues. In the Private
Letter Ruling 9651047, for example, the parties felt it necessary to notify the
United States Department of Justice concerning antitrust issues,' and
request rulings from the Service regarding change of use in facilities financed
by tax exempt bonds, in addition to application for recognition of the
consolidation entity as a tax exempt organization.' These required notices
and requests for rulings and approval involving incremental governmental
review necessarily increase the time and money which must be dedicated to
the endeavor.
The final major group of tasks which go into the building of the joint
operating agreement concerns financial integration. The parties must
determine the formula by which risks and costs will be shared. Participants
will likely bring to the agreement assets and earning potentials of varying
values. These contributions must be reconciled with the need to achieve a
unitary, noncompetitive structure necessary to the application of the integral
part doctrine. A hospital with lower contribution values must nevertheless be
granted a degree of representation in the overall governance such that
individual autonomy and identity is maintained to whatever extent is
allowable within a virtual merger. Additionally, each hospital may bring with
it financial obligations and accrued liabilities which must be integrated into
the whole structure. This may involve the other participant's assumption of
liabilities through guarantees and other third party undertakings. These
financial integration tasks, as with prior tasks, involved significant expenditures of time and money.
The incremental tasks discussed above are also complimented by the
undertaking of prospective obligations. The parties must make various

100. Greater Cincinnati Joint Operating Agreement, supra note 60, at 3. The parties
to Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-011 also submitted the proposed agreement to the Department of
Justice for antitrust review. Burda, supra note 98, at 6. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
The antitrust implications of joint operating agreements are beyond the scope of this article
but are explored in Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., Federal Antitrust Merger Enforcement Standards:
A Good Fit for The Hospital Industry? 20 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 137 (1995).
101. Conditions under which the IRS will issue a favorable change of use ruling are
generally explained in Rev. Proc. 93-17, 1993-1 C.B. 507 and Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-6 I.R.B.
13.
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warranties and accept mutual prohibitions all designed to ensure that the
investment into the unitary structure is maintained for a period of time
sufficient to make the joint operating agreement worth the effort and expense
incurred by each participant and also to achieve the level of permanence
sufficient to achieve a virtual merger. The entire endeavor is completed by
various enforcement and supervision mechanisms which allow each party to
monitor the performance and viability of the other participants.
From a more global perspective, the joint operating agreement
mechanism, at least in the manner in which it is presently implemented,
increases the complexity surrounding the tax code. The joint operating
agreement contributes to the diffusion of authority because it allows exempt
entities to do that which is otherwise prohibited by statute, regulations and
case law"°2 but only after accessing the minds and opinions of those in the
Service charged with enforcing applicable tax law. This is particularly true
with respect to joint operating agreements because the entire mechanism is
implemented via private, nonprecedential letter rulings having no general
applicability. 3 Indeed, implementation of the joint operating agreement as
a condition of necessary consolidation takes undue drafting specificity to new
heights. It essentially involves administrative adjudication one case at a time,
as each joint operating agreement must be submitted to the Service for review
and approval. This final result, too, is essentially a pushing aside of the
judiciary's role since law is applied to fact in the piecemeal fashion most
appropriate to the judicial process.
The building of the joint operating agreement, then, involves
transactional complexity. While, the integral part doctrine is relatively simply
determined, it is very difficult to implement, at least with respect to separate
tax exempt entities who might otherwise consolidate their efforts through the

102. For example, IRC § 501(e) unquestionably denies tax exempt status to an
organization which provides laundry services to unrelated exempt hospitals. HSCS-Laundry
v. U.S., 450 U.S. 1, 7 (1981). But a group of unrelated hospitals can use a joint operating
agreement to create a tax exempt mutually owned laundry facility. In a recent tax court
memorandum decision, Judge Foley made the astonishing distinction that IRC § 501(e)
prevents an organization from gaining tax exempt status by virtue of their provision of services
to "two or more hospitals." But if the organization serves two hospitals and a nonhospital tax
exempt organization, IRC § 501(e) is rendered inapplicable. University Med. Resident Servs.
v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3130, 3131-33 (1996) ("To qualify as a hospital
cooperative under section 501(e), the organization must provide services 'solely for two or
more hospitals.' Petitioners serve schools in addition to hospitals. Thus. they are not hospital
cooperatives, and section 501(e) does not preclude petitioners from qualifying under section
501(c)(3)."). If upheld, the interpretation would render IRC § 501(e) a nullity since hospital
service organizations would only have to add a single nonhospital to get around the prohibition

of IRC § 501(e).
103. IRC § 61100)(3) states that such rulings may not be relied upon as precedent.
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use of mutually-owned subsidiaries or by providing commonly needed
administrative services to one another; that is, the separate entities might
consolidate their efforts without joint operating agreements were it not for the
restrictions of Regulations section 1.502-1(b). But for the adverse tax
consequences created by Regulations section 1.502-1(b), the parties might
very well eliminate the wasteful duplication by creating a mutually-owned
subsidiary using the customary parent-subsidiary model. Alternatively, or
additionally, the parties might enter into relatively simple joint service
contracts whereby one hospital undertakes to provide needed administrative
support services for the others. From a policy standpoint, then, the inquiry
should identify and analyze the tax rules which prevent the hospitals from
resorting to the more simple alternatives and instead undertaking the
difficulties of creating joint operating agreements.
IV. THE UNFAIR COMPETITION RATIONALE
Exactly what is meant by the term "unfair competition" is a useful
inquiry since that is the primary concern of Regulations section 1.502-1(b)
and its resulting joint operating agreement requirement. In its most relevant
sense, unfair competition is the harm to the taxable business community
which results when a tax exempt entity engages in a noncharitable activity." 4 Although the term "charitable activity" is often defined by traditional
104. "Unfair competition" is more often defined by reference to harm to individual
taxable businesses or their investors, as if the harm were actually provable. See John M.
Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of Their Nature and The Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 Akron Tax J. 223, 230-31 (1996); Henry
B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605
(1989) [hereinafter Hansmann, Unfair Competition]; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair
Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (1982). But the cases in
which unfair competition is found are notable for the lack of proof with regard to a particular
taxable entity. Note the hypothetical nature of Justice Marshall's discussion of unfair
competition in American Bar Endowment v. United States:
If ABE's members may deduct part of their premium payments as a
charitable contribution, the effective cost of ABE's insurance will be lower
than the cost of competing policies that do not offer tax benefits.
Similarly, if ABE may escape taxes on its earnings, it need not be as
profitable as its commercial counterparts in order to receive the same
return on its investment. Should a commercial company attempt to
displace ABE as the group policyholder, therefore, it would be at a
decided disadvantage.
The Claims Court failed to find any taxable entities that compete
with ABE, and therefore found no danger of unfair competition. It is
likely, however, that many of ABE's members belong to other organizations that offer group insurance policies. Employers, trade associations, and
financial services companies frequently offer group insurance policies.
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notions of kindness and altruism,' in practice it is just as often identified
by reference to gaps in market availability. The provision of goods and
services which the market does not adequately provide is considered a
"charitable" activity regardless of its dissimilarity to traditional or "inherently" charitable activities such as the provision of food and shelter.t" Filling

Presumably those entities are taxed on their profits, and their policyholders
may not deduct any part of the premiums paid. Such entities may therefore
find it difficult to compete for the business of any ABE members who are
otherwise eligible to participate in these group insurance programs.
477 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1986); see also Living Faith v. Commissioner. 950 F.2d 365, 373 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("It is significant that Living Faith is in direct competition with other restaurants.);
Presbyterian and Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 1984)
("Theprincipal issue we must address is at what point the successful operation of a ax exempt
organization should be deemed to have transformed that organization into a commercial
enterprise and thereby to have forfeited its tax exemption."); Carolinas Farm & Power Equip.
Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 169 (4th Cir. 1983) ("One [court] has held that
the proper inquiry is whether the activity might be unfairly competitive with taxpaying
enterprises ....While... another concludes that . . . the proper inquiry is whether the
activity is conducted in a competitive and commercial manner.") (citations omitted): United
States v. Community Servs., Inc. 189 F.2d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 1951) ("Manifestly, a corporation
engaged in commercial activities, if exempt from federal taxes, would have a tremendous
economic advantage over competitors in the same field. Such a corporation could effectively
eliminate competitors, actual and potential, since it could undersell corporations, whose
earnings are subject to diminution by federal taxation."): Hope School v.United States, 612
F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1980) (evidence must prove a "possibility" of an unfair competitive
advantage over taxpaying greeting card business). Hence, individual taxable entities are rarely,
if ever, actually identified as proven victims of unfair competition. Instead victims are
hypothetically assumed as a proxy for the taxable economy. That is, potential harm is as
equally important as actual harm. See also Bruce R. Hopkins. The Law of Tax Exempt
Organizations 863 (6th ed. 1993) ("[Ilt is theoretically possible for an activity of a tax-exempt
organization to be wholly uncompetitive with a taxpaying organization activity and nonetheless
be treated as an unrelated trade or business.").
105. For the traditional and historical discussion of the concept of "charity," see
Hopkins, supra note 104, at 70-84.
106. This definition of "charitable activity" is not one which I have found explicitly
stated in the literature or judicial opinions, but one which is implied in cases finding that an
organization is either primarily engaged in a business activity or engaged in an unrelated
business activity. See, e.g., supra note 104. Implicit in both findings is the conclusion that
taxable organizations stand willing and able to engage in the activity alleged to be "charitable"
by the organization claiming exempt status. Economically put, then, a "charitable" activity is
one that does not prevent or supplant the normal market operation. At least one other
commentator, Professor Henry Hansmann, seems to indulge a similar "market failure" based
definition. Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 104; Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale
for Exempting Nonprofit Reorganizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale .J.54
(1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Rationale]. Although he states the issue with more sophistication, he still seems to postulate that nonprofits are necessary and justifiable when consumers
cannot reasonably obtain goods and services from the taxable economy:
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a market gap is, rather, "functionally" charitable and therefore entitled to the
indirect subsidy represented by exemption from tax.1°7 But since the taxable
economy is the preferred method by which goods and services should be
provided,'0 8 the government subsidy is unnecessary and counterproductive
to the extent the taxable economy is willing and able to fill the need. Thus,
when the market recognizes and responds to the need, it naturally demands
and is, under economic theory, entitled to the greatest share of the customer
base. The label, unfair competition, is therefore more likely applied to tax
exempt organizations which operate in a market economy supplying similar

Contract failure arises when, owing to the nature of the service
itself or to the circumstances under which it is consumed, the purchasers
of the service-whether we style them donors or consumers-are likely to
have difficulty in (1) comparing the quality of performance offered by
competing providers before a purchase is made, or (2) determining, after
a purchase is made, whether the service was actually performed as
promised. As a result of such conditions, ordinary market competition may
be insufficient to police the performance of for-profit firms, thus leaving
them free to charge excessive prices for inferior service. In such circumstances consumers often turn to nonprofit providers, which, owing to the
nondistribution constraint, [i.e., the prohibition against private inurement]
have less opportunity and incentive to exploit consumers than do for-profit
firms, and thus serve as fiduciaries of a sort for their consumers.
In short, under circumstances of substantial contract failure,
nonprofit firms may serve consumers more efficiently than for-profit firms.
Perhaps, then, tax exemption can be justified as a means of encouraging
the development of nonprofit firms in those industries in which, owing to
the existence of contract failure, they are likely to have this efficiency
advantage.
Hansmann, Rationale, supra, at 69, 71. If this means that tax exemption is necessary and
justified when the market forces leave large number of "patron" needs unfulfilled-because
prices are too high for most patrons, for example-then I agree with the conclusion, although
I do not necessarily agree with the steps leading to the conclusion. At other times, Professor
Hansmann appears to state the conclusion explicitly. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra
note 104, at 617 ("The rationale for granting tax exemption to nonprofits that perform these
functions, such as aiding the poor or performing scientific research, is presumably that the
services involved would be underprovided in the absence of a subsidy."); see also Hopkins,
supra note 104, at 829 ("A tax-exempt organization is engaged in a nonexempt activity when
that activity is engaged in in a manner that is considered 'commercial.' An act is a commercial
one if it has a direct counterpart in the world of for-profit organizations.").
107. See supra note 106. Tax exemption is granted in other cases when the market
fails to provide what is considered a necessary or desirable service. For example, IRC § 108(t)
exempts from taxation income from the discharge of a student loan in exchange for the
performance of services in industries or areas with labor shortages. See IRC § 108(t); see also
supra note 86.
108. Hopkins, supra note 104, at 830.
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goods and services via taxable entities. °9 Correspondingly, when the market
is either unwilling or unable to provide a good or service, an exempt
organization is less likely to be considered to be engaging in unfair
competition.
Thus, when tax exemption subsidizes an entity that prevents or
supplants the normal operation of the taxable economy, the tax exemption is
viewed as encouraging "unfair competition." Hence, the more efficient the
taxable economy is functioning, the easier it is that a tax exempt entity
violates the unfair competition prohibition. The apparent anomaly is that the
tax exempt organization's survival is dependent upon a market structure
which does not satisfy all needs. As the market gets better, the justification
for tax exemption erodes. The goal, though, from a policy standpoint, is to
subsidize the satisfaction of the need, not the operation of a particular entity.
Tax exemption is not a job program. Ideally, then, the managers of a tax
exempt entity would be satisfied that the need is met and voluntarily
relinquish tax exempt status or, still motivated to do good rather than collect
profits, the managers may go on to another charitable endeavor-that is,
identify and satisfy some other need not being met by the market economy.
Some charitable endeavors, primarily the provision of food and
shelter for the poor, education and health care are viewed as so inherent to
human existence that the taxable market can never satisfy the needs
involved."' 0 As implied above, these needs are most often thought of with
respect to the term "charity." In contrast to exempt organizations which
provide functionally charitable activities, exempt organizations which provide
inherently charitable activities are much less likely to be viewed as engaging
in unfair competition precisely because that market is not subject to
monopolization by taxable entities. Thus, unfair competition has a different
meaning or, perhaps no meaning at all, when applied to exempt organizations
engaging in inherently charitable activities.
Implicit in the phrase, "unfair competition," and regardless of whether
one is discussing inherently or functionally charitable activities, is the
recognition that there is some level of competition which is fair, otherwise the
prohibition would simply limit "competition.""' Indeed, for exempt
109. Id.
110. Hansmann, too, acknowledges that his "contract failure" theory, see supra note
106, does not provide a rationale for nonprofit health care organizations generally operating
in a market environment which meets consumer demand. Hansmann, Rationale, supra note
106, at 70.
111. Indeed, the Service recognizes that the primary impetus of joint operating
agreements is the necessity for nonprofit hospitals to compete in the health care market.
Darling & Friedlander, supra note 8, at 132 ("Virtual mergers are intended to unify operations
to achieve cost efficiencies necessary to compete successfully in a managed care environment.").
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organizations which collect and depend in part on user fees, competition is
essential to the accomplishment of the subsidized goal. For example, to
subsidize nonpaying customers or high cost areas, provide a cooperative
discount to all customers, and/or fund research,"' exempt hospitals must
provide a level of service which equals or exceeds the quality of service
available at for-profit hospitals. In the absence of doing so, the exempt
hospital will not attract a sufficient amount of paying customers to supplement its grants and private donations. At least some of the paying customers
might otherwise patronize nonexempt hospitals. Thus, however charitable the
hospital may be, it could not achieve its subsidized goal were it required to
maintain a completely hands off attitude with respect to abled customers.
Certainly, then, the term "unfair competition" is not synonymous with
"competition," but refers to that point at which harm to the taxable economy
is foreseeable.
One of the two primary vehicles for preventing unfair competition is
the requirement that to achieve tax exempt status, an organization must be
"exclusively" engaged in a charitable activity under section 501(c)(3). The
second is that an otherwise qualified tax exempt organization may be subject
to tax on a portion of its revenues under section 511 if those revenues were
obtained through an unrelated activity. Both concepts revolve in sort of a
circular manner around the idea of "substantiality." That is, an organization
may qualify in the first instance as long as any noncharitable activity may be
deemed "insubstantial.""' 3 But the insubstantial activity, if engaged in with
sufficient regularity, will be subject to taxation unless the insubstantial
activity is "substantially" related to the exercise or performance of the
organization's subsidized goal." 4 With respect to the one saving provision,

112. User fees collected by exempt organizations are often used to "cross-subsidize"
other users unable to pay the fees or other high cost functions which do not necessarily
account for revenue (e.g., research). Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J.
835, 877-78 (1980).
113. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)
("[T]he presence of a single non-[exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the
exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes."); Regs.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) ("An organization will be regarded as "operated exclusively" for one or
more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more
of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose.").
114. IRC §§ 511-513. Regs. § 1.513-1(d)(2) states:
Type of relationship required. Trade or business is "related" to exempt
purposes, in the relevant sense, only where the conduct of the business
activities has causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes
(other than through the production of income); and it is "substantially
related," for purposes of section 513, only if the causal relationship is a
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it should be noted that when a noncharitable activity is essential to the
success of the charitable activity, the organization can more efficiently utilize
the tax subsidy if it may itself engage in the necessary but noncharitable
activity. Thus, the foregone tax in that instance encourages the efficiency of
self-help and is apparently based upon the conclusion that the market
opportunity lost to the taxable economy does not result in unfair competition.
The only "customer" lost to the taxable economy is the tax exempt organization which performs the noncharitable activity in-house. The loss of that
single customer, moreover, is outweighed by the benefits ultimately directed
to charitable beneficiaries in greater amounts than if the tax exempt
organization could not economize.
Collectively, these two tools, section 501(c)(3) and section 511,
address the need to establish a basic formula for identifying charitable
institutions on the one hand, and permissible activities for those institutions
on the other. The vagueness necessarily inherent in the term "substantial" in
both provisions is rather to be commended given the market based variability
of the term "charitable." In those difficult cases where the market variability
does not clearly determine whether an activity is charitable or noncharitable,
the judicial system is properly available to make the determination on a caseby-case basis.
Another provision aimed at preventing unfair competition is section
502.25 Commendable, too, for its simplicity, that provision provides that
an organization does not qualify as tax exempt merely because its profits are
used exclusively to support a charitable endeavor. The provision thus
eliminated the "destination of income" rationale as a means of achieving tax
exemption. The operation of that rational is demonstrated by such cases as
Roche's Beach v. Commissioner' 6 and the more infamous successor, C.F.
Mueller v. Commissioner." 7 The entities in both cases achieved tax exempt
status because they were "feeder organizations;" the entities "fed" all of their
profits to entities which were tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) because

substantial one. Thus, for the conduct of trade or business from which a
particular amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to
purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of
the goods or the performance of the service from which the gross income
is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those
purposes.
115. IRC § 502 provides:
An organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade
or business for profit shall not be exempt from taxation under Section 501
on the ground that all of its profits are payable to one or more organizations exempt from taxation under section 501.
116. 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
117. 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
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they engaged in the direct provision of charitable services. In Roche's Beach,
8
the profits were obtained through the normal operation of a beach resort"
and, in C.F. Mueller, the profits were obtained through the normal operation
of a pasta manufacturing corporation." 9 Thus, comparing the activities to
the market-based theory discussed above easily demonstrates the nature of
unfair competition. In both cases, neither entity provided an inherently
charitable service such as food or shelter for the poor, or education. Nor is
there any indication that pasta or beach umbrellas, for example, were in short
supply in the taxable economy because of a lack of consumer demand or
provider willingness or ability. The tax subsidy-tax exemption-was
therefore superfluous and rightly revoked by section 502.
The Service's promulgation of its version of the integral part doctrine
in Regulations section 1.502-1(b) as an interpretive byproduct of section 502
thus suggests a conclusion that the unfair competition potential of companies
which provide goods and services only to exempt organizations is substantially similar to the unfair competition created by feeder organizations. Recall
that under the Service's integral part doctrine, 1) a company is not entitled
to tax exemption merely because it provides necessary goods and services to
unrelated exempt organizations, 2) an exempt organization engages in an
unrelated business activity if it provides necessary goods and services to
unrelated exempt organizations, and 3) an organization can achieve exempt
status and will not engage in unrelated activity if it limits its provisions of
12
goods and services to its single controlling entity and its sister entities. 1
The first determination is based upon the conclusion that acting as a cost or
below cost provider of goods and services exclusively to unrelated tax exempt
organizations is not an "exclusively" charitable activity, even though the
recipients need the goods and services and could provide the goods and
services in-house or through a wholly owned subsidiary without jeopardizing
their exempt status. The second and third determinations are based upon the
conclusions that a tax exempt organization's provision of cost or below cost
goods and services to other exempt organizations is not substantially related
to the accomplishment of the service provider's charitable goals and is
therefore an unrelated business activity. Collectively, the Service's integral
part doctrine treats consolidation entities as though they created unfair
competition to the same extent as feeder organizations.
Treating consolidation entities and feeder organizations as though
they created the same effect, however, is supported neither by statute nor
judicial opinion. Initially, section 502 is not logically consistent with

118. 96 F.2d at 777.
119. 190 F.2d at 120.
120. See supra note 18 (referring to the integral part doctrine).
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Regulations section 1.502-1(b). Section 502 was enacted to address organizations characterized by two identifying factors. First, the organization provides
goods and services to any willing and able purchaser, and only to willing and
able purchasers.12 ' If nothing else, the desire to sell to any willing and able
to pay customer most characterizes encroachment upon the taxable economy.
Second, the excess revenues realized by the organization are used exclusively
to fund admittedly charitable organizations.' -" The Service's integral part
doctrine deals with consolidation entities that provide goods and services
solely to exempt organizations, not to any willing and able to pay customer.
That limitation, too, eliminates the second factor which would make
consolidation entities functionally identical to feeder organizations. By
limiting itself to tax exempt entities, the consolidation entity cannot expect
or desire to fund the admittedly charitable endeavors of the other organizations, except to the extent the consolidation entity allows the exempt
organizations to save funds they have raised from other sources. Thus,
section 502 of the Code and Regulations section 1.502-1(b) are not logically
related.
The apparent inconsistency between the statute and regulation is the
reason why the regulation has been so forcefully criticized by courts which
have explicitly addressed the regulation. In UnitedHospitalServices v United
States,"2 for example, the court was so baffled by the inconsistency that it
incredulously asked: What does [IRC § 502] have to do with two or more
[exempt] organizations setting up a not-for-profit corporation, wholly
controlled by them and not serving the public, in order to effect the
economies in their own charitable operations?' 24
An even more effective indictment is contained in Associated
Hospital Services, Inc. v. Conunissionerl' where the Tax Court stated:
Unlike the abuse situations like Mueller, which sections 502
and 511 were clearly meant to foreclose, we are here dealing
with a closed circle. The "profit" does not derive from
outside sources and flow to the exempt organizations, as in
the Mueller line of cases. Nor does it flow from vendors to

121. See United States v. Community Sets.. 189 F.2d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 1951)
("Taxpayer was, in effect, organized and operated for two purposes: (1) to engage in
commercial business, for profit, and (2) to turn over the profits realized from its commercial
activities to charitable organizations."), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952). reh'g denied, 343
U.S. 911 (1952).
122. Id.
123. 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
124. Id. at 782.
125. 74 T.C. 213 (1980).
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potentially nonexempt destinations, as in B.S. W. Group Inc.
v. Commissioner... and FederationPharmacy Service, Inc.
v. Commissioner. We would therefore question whether the
profit, if any, derived by petitioner was any different from
the profit between an exempt parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiary ... 126
Associated Hospital Services, Inc., is worth reviewing in detail
because it provides a useful case study of the issues raised by Regulations
section 1.502-1(b) and the joint operating agreement requirement. In that
case, four 501(c)(3) hospitals and two county-owned hospitals created
Associated Hospital Service, Inc. ("Associated"). 2 7 Associated's sole
purpose was to provide bacteria free laundry service exclusively to the six
hospitals. Although taxable entities provided normal laundry services in the
locale in which the hospitals operated, they did not provide the specialized
laundry services needed by the hospitals. 2 Nevertheless, the Service denied
Associated Hospital's application for tax exempt status because, in its view,
Associated was a feeder organization described in section 502 and also failed
129
to meet the qualification provisions of section 501(e).
Section 501(e) is one of the Congressional provisions mentioned
earlier which recognize the consolidation concept as a basis of tax exemption.13 ° The provision grants tax exempt status to organizations which
provide statutorily identified services exclusively to hospitals. Laundry
service, however, is not one of the identified categories.' The Service
therefore concluded that Associated did not qualify under section 501(e). At
the time of Associated's application for tax exempt status, every other court
to have considered the issue, all of which were district courts, had concluded
that section 501(e)'s specific delineation of services did not preclude
organizations which provided nondelineated services from qualifying for tax
exempt status. 132 The Tax Court, however, had not previously addressed the
issue and did not do so in this case either.

126. Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 214.
128. Id. at 215.
129. Id. at 213.
130. See supra note 31.
131. The listed services are "data processing, purchasing (including purchasing of
insurance on a group basis), warehousing, billing and collection, food, clinical, industrial
engineering, laboratory, printing, communications, record center, and personnel (including
selection, testing, training, and education of personnel) services." IRC § 501(e)(1)(A).
132. 74 T.C. 213, 222-23.
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Since Associated provided laundry services to unrelated exempt
organizations, the Service also concluded that it could not gain exempt status
in any event because Regulations section 1.502- 1(b) prevented tax exemption
for consolidation entities. The Tax Court gave considerable attention to this
conclusion. Its discussion not only reflected unfavorably on the methods by
which the Service promulgated the regulation but also demonstrated the
logical invalidity of the regulation. If the Court had the magic of foresight
and known that the Service would later allow that which Associated sought,
via joint operating agreements and without any change to statutes or
regulations underlying the Service's arguments in the case before it, the Tax
Court might have overturned the Service's conclusions as simply creating
unnecessary complexity. Instead, even despite the unfavorable analysis, the
Court sustained the regulation essentially on the ground that the regulation
had not been changed in the thirty years since it had been enacted.'"
The Tax Court began its discussion by tracing the purpose of section
502's enactment in 1950 and the history of Regulations section 1.502-I (b)'s
enactment in 1952. It noted that the regulation purported to further the
legislative purpose of preventing the unfair competition which motivated the
enactment of sections 502 and 51 L. Following the statutory enactment,
the Service issued the regulation and Revenue Ruling 54-305135 in both of
which it concluded that consolidation entities such as Associated created
unfair competition. The Court noted, however, that Revenue Ruling 54-305
"made no effort to analyze the commercial aspects of the subject corporation's activities, notwithstanding the foregoing legislative rationale for the
adoption of the feeder organization provisions.' 3 6 Instead, according to the
Court, the Service "simply assumed" that a consolidation entity creates unfair
competition.
The Court referred to a 1958 Court of Claims decision'3 rejecting
the conclusions stated in Regulations section 1.502-1(b) and noted that the
Service "rather obliquely" attempted to solidify the rejected regulation by
"quietly" amending it.138 According to the Court, the Service clarified that

133. Id. at 230.
134. Id. at 216-18.
135. Rev. Rul. 1954-2 C.B. 127. In that ruling, the Service concluded that a
purchasing organization which served only exempt hospitals was engaged in a noncharitable
trade or business and therefore was not entitled to tax exemption.
136. Id. at 218.
137. Hospital Bureau of Standards & Supplies, Inc. v. United States, 158 F. Supp.
560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
138. The commissioner declined to go along with the result in Hospital
Bureau of Standards & Supplies, Inc., and rather obliquely attempted to
solidify his position by amending section 1.502-1(b) to limit the concept
of related organizations to a formal parent-subsidiary relationship. The
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organizations are not sufficiently related simply because they engage in the
same activity. 39 The amendments contradicted the conclusions made by the
Court of Claims and, if upheld, would mean that consolidation entities do not
achieve tax exempt status under the integral part doctrine unless there exists
some formal relationship between the parties served by the consolidation
entity. Significantly, though, the Court found the focus on the relationship
between the consolidation entity and the service recipients as "totally beside
the point."1 40 That conclusion was the Court's way of saying that the
relationship has no relevancy to the question of whether a particular activity
results in unfair competition. The Court stated as much when it observed:
In terms of effect on competition, the case where a subsidiary provides integrally related services to only one entity, its
exempt parent, may, depending on the facts and circumstances, stand in contrast to the jointly owned service organization
situation. In the former situation, it might be argued that the
entity could not, standing alone, preempt the market because
it only serves one parent, while in the latter situation, it
could. On the other hand, there may be little to distinguish,
in terms of frustrating commercial competition, between one
giant hospital doing its own laundry and four small ones
using a jointly owned cooperative.'4 1
Although it did not reject the regulation, the Court's opinion persuasively
articulated the inherent inconsistencies between section 502 and Regulations
section 1.502-1(b). It also clearly suggested the logical invalidity of the
regulation.
The invalidity demonstrated by comparing the statute and regulation
and by judicial opinions, though, is for the most part merely technical.
Certainly, the regulation is misplaced to the extent it purports to interpret or
expand upon the problem addressed by section 502. In Associated Hospital
Service, the damning opinion is largely a result of the Court's comparison of
the regulation with section 502, the statute under which the regulation was
enacted. But the regulation could be divided into its constituent parts and
those parts would logically fall under either section 501 or section 511. The

amendment stated that "An exempt organization is not related to another
exempt organization merely because they both engage in the same type of
exempt activities."
74 T.C. 213, 219 (citations omitted); Regs. § 1.502-1(b)(2) (last sentence).
139. 74 T.C. at 219.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 227.
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determination that tax exemption should not be granted to a consolidation
entity is essentially stating a conclusion that such activity is not exclusively
charitable; that instead it is a nonexempt activity. As such, that portion of
Regulations section 1.502-1(b) containing that determination would more
properly be promulgated under section 501, setting aside for the moment the
determination's substantive merit. The second and third determinations which
state that a tax exempt organization engages in unrelated activity if it
provides goods and services to an unrelated exempt organization, but does not
do so if the other exempt organization is a parent or sister organization, are
essentially drawing distinctions between activities that are and are not
substantially related to the achievement of the parent's charitable goal. Thus,
the last two parts would more properly be promulgated under section 511.
The apparent misplacement of Regulations section 1.502-1 (b) may prove its
technical invalidity but it does not address its substantive merit.
It is, as shown above, possible to identify the overriding concern of
the unfair competition prohibitions, i.e., the maintenance of the taxable
market's ability to provide goods and services.'4 2 It is altogether a different
matter to identify those facts which, in every case, will support the conclusion
that the activities of a particular tax exempt organization impedes the
market's ability to function effectively. 143 Therefore it is impossible to state
categorically that the consolidation efforts prohibited by the integral part
doctrine do not constitute unfair competition. The one thing that can be
determined, however, is that joint operating agreements allow the identical
degree of consolidation otherwise prohibited by the Regulations section
1.502-1(b). Where the regulation prohibits unrelated exempt organizations
from sharing the costs of goods and services, the Service's joint operating
agreement allows such sharing. Where the regulation denies tax exempt status
to a consolidation entity, the Service's joint operating agreement requirement
grants exemption. Likewise, where specific statutory law denies tax exempt
status to an entity which provides laundry service to unrelated hospitals, for
example, the joint operating agreement allows such activity.
It is difficult to see how the result in one instance can be characterized as unfair competition while the identical result in another is fair
competition. The identical result in either case, where one method is
prohibited and the other allowed, leads inexorably to the conclusion that
consolidation such as that prohibited in the absence of joint operating
agreements does not really constitute unfair competition. With the joint
operating agreement mechanism, it is the achievement of centralized control
142. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
143. "While an economically sophisticated definition of unfairness is possible, its
application involves subtle empirical issues--so subtle that they may be beyond the
administrative capacities of the IRS." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 104. at 1022.
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between otherwise unrelated exempt organizations that apparently is thought
to alleviate the market harm which characterizes the concept of unfair
competition. The lack of centralized control is the apparent basis of
Regulations section 1.502-1(b)'s consolidation prohibitions. This suggests,
without explanation, that the process of consolidation embodied in joint
operating agreements somehow alleviates the unfair competition resulting in
the absence of joint operating agreements. But the unfair competition is
concerned with the resulting harm to the taxable economy, not the process
by which the harm occurs. With joint operating agreements, the result relative
to the policy interest in maintaining the viability of, or at least maintaining
governmental neutrality with respect to, the taxable economy, is identical to
the result which would occur without Regulations section 1.502-1 (b). To the
extent taxable entities would be denied certain market opportunities in the
absence of the regulation, the resulting denial is identical using the joint
operating agreement mechanism.
Certainly, unchecked consolidation between tax exempt entities might
very well constitute unfair competition in the same manner that monopolies
are thought to affect the taxable economy,'" but that case has not been
made and indeed is weakened by the approval of joint operating agreements
which allow an identical, and in most cases increased consolidating result as
that which would be available in the absence of Regulations section 1.5021(b) 145. The only difference is the process by which that result is obtained.
As the Tax Court in Associated Hospital Services noted, focusing on the
process is "totally beside the point."'' 46 This conclusion is supported by
prior rulings and statutory provisions which grant tax exempt status to
consolidation entities without regard to the relationship between the
consolidation entity and the service-recipient organizations.' 47 Thus, had the
Tax Court in AssociatedHospital Services been presented with the knowledge
that the decried consolidation was available under a more complicated
process, it very well might have been more confident in its speculation that
consolidation does not ipso facto constitute unfair competition and rejected
the regulation.
As noted earlier, creating a joint operating agreement is a complicated
and burdensome process. The transactional complexity of joint operating
agreements. by discouraging consolidation, ultimately decreases the extent to

144. See supra note 100.
145. The imposition of the joint operating agreement requirement essentially makes
mergers, real or otherwise, a necessary step to achieve consolidation and will therefore
encourage market clout being concentrated in larger organizations than would result if
unrelated exempt hospitals were allowed to share burdens or utilize mutual organizations.
146. 74 T.C. at 219.
147. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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which charitable funds are used to achieve the charitable goal and, to that
extent, reduces the effectiveness of the tax subsidy"48 Since process is
irrelevant to the unfair competition, the transactional complexity of joint
operating agreements serves no purpose except a counterproductive one. That
is, exempt organizations which would consolidate in any event, using multiple
in-house facilities or single, multiple-parent subsidiaries, are forced to divert
even more of the charitable fisc away from charitable beneficiaries and
instead to tax compliance activities. Hence, the subsidy of tax exemption
would be more effective if Regulations section 1.502-1(b) were repealed.
V. CONCLUSION
When exempt organizations share the costs of necessary administrative services by providing at or below costs goods and services to one
another, they effectuate what is essentially a self-contained economy.
Charitable funds come to the economy through grants, donations, user fees,
and government tax exemption. Ideally, these funds should leave the selfcontained economy only by way of charitable beneficiaries and then in the
greatest amounts possible. When entities within the self-contained economy
must duplicate the efforts of one another, the goal of providing the greatest
amount of funds to charitable beneficiaries is thwarted and all contributing
sources to the charitable fisc are used inefficiently. The charitable fisc is
wasted. Taxation of the effort to share administrative costs discourages
efficiency and renders counterproductive the tax subsidy represented by tax
exemption.
It is incorrect to simply assume, as Regulations section 1.502-1(b)
does, that efficiencies between unrelated entities necessarily results in "unfair"
competition and therefore should be discouraged by the imposition of
taxation. Indeed, consolidation might be viewed as denying a market
opportunity to taxable entities that would otherwise be called upon to provide
the goods and services necessary to the charitable goal. But it is not a given
that taxable entities are entitled or would be called upon to provide these
goods and services. Regulations section 1.502-1 (b), being logically related to

148. The prospect of merging with a neighbor can excite a board that is
focused on reducing costs and investing the community's charitable
resources as rationally as possible, without duplication of services. Yet.
boards can be frustrated in their attempt to merge by a regulatory structure
that ascribes private, corporate (profit-maximizing) motives to them.
Although many such mergers are announced, far fewer actually close, and
an even smaller number proceed to achieve the kind of rationalization that
spurred the merger in the first place.
Hollis, supra note 25, at 135.
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the substantiality concepts of sections 501 and 511, admits that even when an
exempt organization may not resort to another unrelated tax exempt
organization for goods and services, the exempt organization can provide the
services on an in-house basis or through a wholly-owned subsidiary. Thus,
the foregone market ostensibly thought to be protected by the integral part
doctrine is not one which would necessarily be satisfied by taxable entities
or one that even exists since exempt organizations are not at all more likely
to chose a higher costing taxable entity to provide the goods and services
over an in-house facility or a wholly-owned subsidiary. The prohibition of
consolidation between unrelated exempt entities contained in Regulations
section 1.502-1(b) incorrectly assumes that tax exempt entities will indeed
become customers of taxable entities.
The repeal of Regulations section 1.502-1(b) would therefore
eliminate the complexity of joint operating agreements and leave sections 501
and 511 as the basic tools with which to prevent unfair competition.
Providing tax exemption to consolidation entities through the joint operating
agreement mechanism already suggests that consolidation entities would pass
muster under those provisions since centralized control is the only element
added by joint operating agreements and that element has no logical
relationship to the prevention of unfair competition. Insistence upon that
added element mistakenly assumes that the market harm of "unfair"
competition is a function of process-building a joint operating agreement-rather than a function of result. Since it is the result that determines
"unfair" competition and since the permitted consolidating result is the same
whether joint operating agreements are required or not, Regulations section
1.502-1(b) and its resulting joint operating agreement requirement serves only
to create unnecessary complexity and should therefore be discarded.

